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Transport in the Island Nations of Britain and Japan 
 
 
Britain and Japan, fellow island nations, share many geographical similarities, and 
accordingly both societies have long taken advantage of water transport domestically.  In 
modern times the two nations’ governments have diverged in terms of philosophies 
toward economy and industrialization.  Britain is known as today’s consummate private-
industry advocate within western Europe, while Japan is noted for the strong level of 
government “guidance” in its post-WWII economy.  Using the abovementioned 
similarities as a baseline, this thesis examines how the supposedly different relationships 
between government and economy in Britain and Japan have affected the ongoing use of 
water in their domestic transport sectors since World War II.  Some forms of water 
transport have continued to thrive commercially in both nations, due primarily to those 
forms’ inherent economic and technical advantages, while other water transport modes 
are maintained through government support because of other, less commercial benefits 
they offer to the two societies. 
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 1  
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Britain and Japan, 1858.  The two island empires had little 
in common when at Britain’s demand their representatives 
met that August to negotiate a commercial treaty.  Britain, a 
world-wide empire dedicated to free trade; Japan, a group 
of four islands, almost isolated from the world for more 
than two centuries by a self-imposed seclusion policy.  
Britain, a constitutional monarchy run by a parliamentary 
system; Japan, a decadent military dictatorship.  Britain, a 
rich manufacturing nation; Japan, a traditionally feudal 
society undermined by a developing money economy.” 1 
 
With these words Grace Estelle Fox begins her comprehensive study of these two 
“island empires.” In her work Ms. Fox examines the first twenty-five years of official 
interaction between Britain 2 and Japan.  However, in asserting that the two island nations 
– no longer empires in today’s parlance – “had little in common,” she appears to neglect 
geography.  The two were called “island empires” for a reason:  excluding overseas 
territories, each of them is composed of a handful of main islands surrounded by a 
plethora of smaller ones.  In Japan, other than the “four islands” mentioned by Ms. Fox, 
there are more than four-hundred-fifty smaller populated ones. 3  Britain boasts about a 
hundred inhabited isles off the coasts of Scotland alone. 4  In true island fashion, both 
countries have a very high length of coastline relative to their land area when compared 
                                                
1  Fox, Britain and Japan, 3. 
 
2  Unless otherwise specified, in this thesis “Britain” is used interchangeably with “UK,” to give historical 
continuity with the pre-Northern Ireland entity. 
 
3  Un’yushō, Un’yu hakusho, 1965 Kakuron II (I) Dai 2-shō Dai 2-setsu no 5. See Appendix B for 
information on how to navigate Japanese white papers. 
 
4  Scottish Executive, Scotland’s Transport Future, 10. 
 
 2  
with continental states.  Nowhere in either country can one find a point on land more than 
seventy-two miles away from the sea. 5 
Geographical similarities were just that, however – similarities, not exactly the same.  
Each of the four main islands of Japan has a tall mountainous spine running roughly 
down its center, so that including several volcanoes and hilly areas, about 75% of Japan’s 
total land area is mountainous.  Peaks, reaching up to 12,400 feet (3800 meters) at Mount 
Fuji’s summit, are often separated by valleys, so that mountain sides are steep. 6  Given 
this topography, the bulk of Japan’s rivers descend rapidly out of the mountains and then 
travel only a short distance over lowland plains to the ocean.  Their water levels vary 
widely during the year, making them prone to flooding.  Rivers emptying into the Pacific 
Ocean (on the south and east coast of Honshū, Japan’s main island, as well as on Kyushu 
and Shikoku, Japan’s third- and fourth-largest islands, respectively) run highest during 
Japan’s monsoon and typhoon seasons (early and late summer, respectively) and run low 
in the winter.  Those emptying into the Japan Sea (on Honshū’s north coast) are highest 
in spring due to snow runoff. 7  Britain, on the other hand, is split roughly into two zones 
by a line running from the Exe River in the southwest, up to the Tees River in the 
Northeast.  The area north of this line, comprising all of Scotland and Wales and the 
extremities of western and northern England, is considered Britain’s highlands.  The 
lowlands, south of the line, comprise the bulk of England.    In this part of the country, 
the plains are interrupted at most by hills.  Even in the highlands, the mountains are low 
                                                
5  113km (70 miles) for Britain (see Haran, “farm furthest from the sea”), 115km (72 miles) for Japan (see 
Saku Shiyaku-sho, “Nihon de umi kara…”). 
 
6 Geographical Survey Institute, National Atlas of Japan, 5. 
 
7 Ibid., 22. The Japan Sea coast of Honshū receives much more snow in winter than the Pacific coast, 
especially north of Tokyo. 
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compared with those of Japan – Britain’s tallest peak, Ben Nevis, stands at 4400 feet – 
and many mountainous areas above 2000 feet take the form of elevated plateaus rather 
than the alternating steep mountain faces and valleys of Japan. 8  This division between 
highlands and lowlands also leads to a drainage divide in Britain that runs north to south 
but whose axis is far west of England’s longitudinal center.  Rivers flowing west from the 
divide have a comparatively short, quick trip out to the Atlantic Ocean or Irish Sea, 
whereas those flowing east are longer and tend to coalesce into wide estuaries near 
England’s east and south coasts.  Rainfall is much more evenly distributed throughout the 
year in Britain than in Japan, so seasonal changes in river heights are less pronounced in 
Britain. 9   
Settlement in England was thus not limited to coastal areas, as it largely was in Japan.  
Early population centers of Britain, such as London, were ports located inland along 
rivers in England’s lowland areas, providing access to the sea for coastal shipping but 
also protection from dangerous seafarers.  It was only after the Norman Conquest, during 
a huge urban expansion in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries due largely to 
growing international shipping trade, that Britain’s port system moved outward to the 
coasts. 10  Historically most of Japan’s population settled in the relatively narrow lowland 
plain areas running along the coasts.  From the fifth century CE Japanese rulers were 
establishing their capitals on Honshū in the lowland plain to the east of the Seto Inland 
Sea.  This area offered a benevolent climate and cultivable land with fertile soil, but also 
                                                
8 Gilbert, “United Kingdom,” 1-2 
 
9  Ibid., 4-5 
 
10  Hutchinson, Medieval Ships, 105. 
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access to the relatively calm waters of the Inland Sea, which linked Honshū with the 
nearby main islands of Shikoku and Kyushu. 11  This plain area, known as Kinai, would 
be Japan’s dominant population and economic center up until premodern times, featuring 
the urban areas of Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe.  Japan’s largest lowland-plain area, Kantō, 
would become host to a growing population after the establishment of the military 
shogunate government there at the end of the twelfth century.  The premodern Tokugawa 
shoguns would establish their capital, Edo, in the Kantō plain as well, and Edo would 
later grow into the modern capital of Tokyo.   
Another point of strong similarity between Britain and Japan which Ms. Fox omits 
concerns transport.  Both nations have been transporting people and goods on their 
coastal waters since the beginnings of their recorded histories, a practice known as 
coastal shipping (Japanese:  naikō kaiun or engan kaiun).  Boats often found their way 
along substantial numbers of navigable rivers as well.  When river access was insufficient 
artificial waterways – canals – were constructed.  Transport on rivers or canals was 
known as inland water transport (IWT) (Japanese:  nairiku suiun or kasen shūun). 
But why would Britain and Japan use water transport so readily?  After all, Japan had 
an organized overland system of roads, complete with an ekisei network of horse relay 
stations, from at least the seventh century CE. 12  Britain made use of the legacy Roman 
road network while adding their own improvements, especially from the sixteenth 
century on, when the capacity to raise money and labor for road upkeep more easily 
                                                
11  Shapinsky, Lords of the Sea, 25, 28-9. 
 
12  Toyoda and Kodama, Kōtsū-shi, 9. 
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enabled local bodies to develop the turnpike system. 13  The simple answer to the 
question of “why water?” is that transport on water is simply more efficient than over 
land, due to the low friction between ship and water.  In eighteenth-century Britain a 
horse was able to pull a one-ton load on the poorly-designed and constructed roads, 
perhaps two tons on the best roads, while a barge floating on a canal could be pulled by 
that same horse with thirty tons or more loaded on it.  A horse-drawn wagon on the roads 
could carry up to four tons, a horse-pulled cart 1.5 tons, and a pack horse could be fitted 
with up to two hundred pounds.  An average “coaster” (coastal-shipping vessel), by 
comparison, could haul seventy tons, while the largest coasters could haul three hundred 
tons. 14  A typical overland trip in Tokugawa-era Japan cost six times more than a similar 
trip over a lake, and up to 17.5 times more than in coastal waters.  On land each koku (a 
traditional measure) of cargo required the accompaniment of one horse and rider, 
whereas on a boat a thousand-koku load needed at most a twenty-man crew. 15   An 
example British scenario, using a load of fifty tons, will show the incredible economies of 
coastal shipping versus overland freight carriage.  By land the fifty-ton load would 
require thirteen horse-drawn wagons, each with one conductor and six horses, for a total 
of thirteen conductors and seventy-eight horses; by contrast an average coastal vessel, 
which could easily handle the whole fifty-ton load, required a crew of only four or five 
people.  Each four-ton freight portion on land would cost £10 per horse and £40 for the 
wagon, giving a total of £10 x 6 + £40 = £100 per four-ton segment, or £100 * 12.5 = 
£1250 total for the fifty tons not including the cost of £20 per day for horse feed.  A 
                                                
13  Dyos and Aldcroft, British Transport, 29-34. 
 
14  Armstrong, “British Coastal Shipping,” 16-17. 
 
15  Toyama, Ninomiya, and Baba, “Dōro miseibi no haikei,” 97. 
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coaster would cost a maximum of £24 for each four tons, or £24 * 12.5 = £300 for the 
fifty-ton load.  In other words, freight rates on coastal shipping lines could amount to less 
than ¼ that of land carriage with horses.  Coastal shipping had additional advantages.  
Costs were incurred only at start and end points of a journey irrespective of the distance 
between them, meaning the longer the trip, the lower the transport cost per ton-mile.  For 
road transport costs rose in proportion to distance due to the necessity of horse feed and 
manpower wages that were computed relative to trip length.  Normally horses had a 
working life of five years, as opposed to twenty years for an average ship.  Even the 
supposed major drawback of coastal shipping, its slow speed, was not necessarily a fact.  
A well-loaded wagon could travel perhaps twenty miles a day on roads before stopping 
for the night, but a coaster, running at all hours of the day and night, could travel one-
hundred forty miles in a twenty-four-hour period. 16 
For all of these reasons, any kind of low-value bulky freight in premodern Britain or 
Japan would travel by coastal shipping wherever possible.  If start and end points were 
close enough to the coast, and transport distances greater than forty miles or so, even trips 
carrying higher-value freight would be made on coasters. 17  The benefits were even 
greater if the portions of a trip between inland start/end points and the coast were done on 
water as well, whether by natural (river) or artificial (canal) waterway.  The proximity of 
Japan’s population centers – the lowland plains – to the nation’s coastline meant 
relatively easy access for coastal shipping.  Freight could be carried the short distance 
over land to the coastline for loading onto boats, and according to early evidence 
                                                
16   Armstrong, “British Coastal Shipping,” 16-18. 
 
17  Ibid., 19. 
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Japanese used the relatively flat, lowland sections of their rivers as thoroughfares 
between inland locales and the coastline. 18  Both Kinai and Kantō are blessed with large 
navigable waterways allowing freight to be carried from inland extremities of the lowland 
plains out to the ocean.  Their respective population centers, Osaka and Edo, were located 
on calm, protected waters (Inland Sea or Tokyo Bay) at the mouths of those large rivers. 
19  With respect to England, much of its lowland was within short distance of rivers, on 
which freight was moved extensively.  Even after the port system moved outward to the 
coasts to provide easier access for large deep-sea ships, river transport was kept active 
through river improvement and diversion projects as early as the thirteenth century.  The 
coastal port ring formed many of its nodes at locations offering inland access through 
waterways. 20 
A main goal of this thesis is to show how demand for waterborne transport in the 
economies of Britain and Japan was, and still is, largely proportional to water transport’s 
technical advantages over carriage on land.  Once quick, efficient, high-capacity overland 
transport modes appeared in the nineteenth century, waterborne modes began to lose their 
prominence.  The first overland mode of this type, the railways, usurped much of the 
passenger traffic in both countries within short order, and took a significant share of 
freight traffic as well.  Canals always suffered from low speeds and a host of technical 
issues; they could compete with road transport at low speeds, but succumbed in short 
order to the relatively swift railways.  Coastal shipping continued to hold on to a 
significant portion of each nation’s freight traffic because railways could never quite 
                                                
18  For example, see Yamamoto, Transportation in Japan, 4, or Yui,  “Introduction,” xii. 
 
19  Mosk, Japanese Industrial History, 18. 
 
20  Bagwell and Lyth, Transport in Britain, 21; Duckham, “Canals and River Navigations,” 132. 
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match its economies of scale for large loads of bulk, low-value cargo.  Passenger 
transport, which had always been popular on coasters and less so (but not nonexistent) on 
canal boats, continued on well past World War II.  Motor vehicles proved to offer even 
stronger competition for waterborne transport, especially after the construction of large 
motorway networks starting in the late 1950s and 1960s.  After this point road haulage 
largely eclipsed freight traffic on canals, yet again coastal shipping held on to a 
significant portion of domestic freight traffic due to economies of scale.   
Comparisons 
The historical literature on domestic transport is quite rich for both Britain and Japan, 
as is attested to by the many titles in the bibliography.  Moreover, such works frequently 
illustrate the specific advantages of waterborne transport discussed here.  Yet the existing 
literature addresses transport in each country individually, rather than comparing Britain 
and Japan with respect to transport.  This thesis takes a comparative approach to the two 
countries.  In doing so it extends to transport, the comparative study of the two countries 
undertaken in other areas of history.  By setting the two nations’ similar geographies as a 
baseline, this thesis will compare and contrast political, industrial, and economic 
developments in Britain and Japan to show what effects, if any, those developments have 
had on the fortunes of water transport in the two countries’ histories.  Prior to the advent 
of efficient, high-speed overland transport – railways – in the nineteenth century, water 
transport in both countries faced no substantial overland competition and thus was used 
wherever possible out of utility or even necessity, regardless of political, industrial, or 
economic developments.  After World War II, however, the rapid proliferation of 
motorized transport with the spread of modern, high-speed roadways meant the existence 
 9  
of two highly-competitive overland alternatives to water.  Focusing on the post-World 
War II era, the thesis will address the question whether other differences in the two 
countries changed the distribution of transport differently among these alternatives. 
This chronological focus has the advantage of an abundance of readily-available 
primary sources published since World War II which illustrate both governmental and 
private-industry perspectives on developments in the transport sector.  Two main classes 
of primary sources were consulted for this thesis:  government transport white papers and 
newspaper articles.  A white paper may be defined as “a kind of declaration of intention 
in which the [issuing body] commits itself to a clear policy and actions that go with it…it 
should be the consequence of intensive prior consultation within and outside the [issuing 
body].” 21   White papers thus give first-hand insight into public transport policy.  
Newspaper articles, on the other hand, were used in the research for this thesis because 
they often quote, or at least summarize, the opinions of a wide range of members of the 
private transport industry, all the way from representatives of large shipping companies 
to owners of small coastal vessels. 
Other than their similar monikers, the white papers of Britain and Japan are very 
different animals.  The postwar Japanese national transport ministry has published these 
papers annually since 1964, all available online.  Each year’s copy is extensive, giving a 
plethora of statistics, the names and dates of key laws and regulations, much history – 
Japanese transport history and economic history more generally – and separate detailed 
sections for 1) “hot” topics of the year; and 2) the latest occurrences in each transport 
mode.  While a direct Japanese translation of “White papers,” un’yu hakusho or kōtsū 
hakusho, is a common term used to describe these documents, the formal name, un’yu 
                                                
21  European Commission, “What is a White Paper?”  
 10  
keizai nenji hōkoku or “Annual Transport Economy Reports,” 22 more accurately reflects 
their nature.  British white papers, in comparison, have been published sporadically in the 
postwar period.  Each one covers either global transport policy or focuses on one of its 
specific facets.  They present government ideas and directions, and embellish little with 
statistics or historical information. 23  British White Papers at times ooze emotion, 
especially when discussing key policy supported by either political party but not by both, 
while Japanese white papers are largely dispassionate in tone.  One can understand this 
difference in light of several important facts about the two countries’ political systems. 
  From the beginning of Japan’s shift in the late 1860s to a modern industrialized 
economy, its governments have felt justified in pursuing a high level of intervention in 
the nation’s economic development, even in industries such as coastal shipping where 
ownership and operation have remained nominally private. 24  Postwar governments have 
carried on this tradition, their job made easier by Japan’s unique political situation:  from 
1955 on one party has dominated Japan’s political arena virtually uninterrupted to the 
present.  This is the Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP (Jiyū Minshu-tō, usually Jimintō 
for short).  While debate occurs between the LDP and minority parties in the National 
Diet, Japan’s version of the U.S. Congress, this political posturing acts effectively as a 
veneer hiding the true legislative engine of the country, its elite state bureaucracy.  
                                                
22  See Un’yushō, Un’yu hakusho, published annually by the Japan Ministry of Transport (Un’yushō) from 
1964 to 2000.  From 2001 on they have been published under the Ministry’s new name, Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) (in Japanese: Kokudo Kōtsū-shō); see Kokudo 
Kōtsū-shō, Kokudo kōtsū hakusho. 
 
23  Due to this latter point, in the researching of this thesis British Government Transport Acts were 
consulted as well for information on specific laws and regulations. 
 
24  The glaring exception to this rule was the government’s attempt in the very beginning of the Meiji era to 
start up a public coastal shipping enterprise.  Chapter II shows how this venture failed in short order, 
after which the government pursued a policy of financial support and strategic “advice” towards private 
coastal-shipping firms. 
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Predominantly graduates of the nation’s best law schools, the members of this 
bureaucracy enter the various government ministries on the basis of national 
examinations, not through appointment by elected officials.  Japan’s leading elected 
official, the prime minister, has the power to appoint only about twenty ministers or 
agency chiefs throughout the entire government.  The result is a civil service that “drafts 
virtually all laws, ordinances, orders, regulations, and licenses that govern society” and 
which “has extensive extra-legal powers of ‘administrative guidance’ and is 
comparatively unrestrained in any way, both in theory and in practice, by the judicial 
system.” 25  This has allowed a remarkable long-term continuity of policy direction in 
Japan, largely free of the shakeups created by regular electoral turnover of appointed 
bureaucrats such as members of the U.S. Cabinet.  Given their annual release, their 
detailed and voluminous nature, and their political neutrality, it is hard to imagine that 
busy, politically involved Ministers of Transport or their appointees would have much 
say in the composition of Japan’s transport white papers.  No doubt they are the product 
of the insulated ranks of civil servants.   
Quite different from Japan’s transport experience in the modern era, in Britain 
“[g]iven the [earlier] success of private enterprise in so radically improving transport 
provision by water, by road and… by rail… the liberal politicians of the nineteenth 
century were content to ‘leave it to the market’ to choose how and where to invest in 
service-provision…” 26  As Chapter II will show, it was only with the outbreak of World 
War I that British governments would start to challenge this laissez-faire trend.  After 
                                                
25  Johnson, Japan: Who Governs?, 13. 
 
26 Glaister et al., Transport Policy in Britain, 15. 
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World War II Britain’s government would again differ markedly from Japan’s, this time 
in the sphere of politics.  Post-WWII British politics would continue a tradition started in 
the 1920s, whereby the Labour Party and Conservative Party would trade national power 
back and forth.  Vastly different from the gradual, long-term evolution of transport policy 
in Japan, Britain experienced many shifts and even reversals of public policy with all the 
changings of the political guard.  White papers offered a means for the parties to extend 
their policy debates into a public written forum, where occasionally they even pointed out 
the “errors” of previous administrations. 27  Politicians filling top-level transport posts, 
including Transport Ministers themselves, have had extensive input into the drafting of 
the white papers.  This can be seen from the prefaces, drafted by transport Ministers, that 
often accompany the papers especially in more recent decades, as well as from ministerial 
notes attached to white paper drafts available in British government archives. 28 
The authors of the Japanese transport white papers, in the interest of thoroughness, 
repeat much of the same information from year to year.  While this may be useful for a 
reader tracking, for example, the annual funding of a specific transport program, 
researchers looking for more global trends must comb carefully through the white papers’ 
voluminous text to find truly new transport developments or directions.  Since Britain’s 
white papers, on the other hand, are published sporadically and not according to a regular 
schedule, the researcher can be fairly certain that each paper will hold significant changes 
in policy developments or directions.  Naturally, the first paper, or set of papers, after a 
change of government leadership from one political party to the other tend to signify 
                                                
27 For example, in a 1966 transport policy white paper the Labour government of the time complained of 
“…the determination of successive Conservative governments to destroy the machinery for integrating 
road and rail transport.” Ministry of Transport, Transport Policy, at para. 90. 
 
28 For an excellent example see National Archives Online, “Cabinet Papers 1915-1986.” 
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relatively fundamental shifts in transport policy.  Of course, given the rapid turnover of 
British politics as compared with those in Japan the white-paper reader must be prepared 
for new policy changes or even reversals with each switch of party in power, whereas in 
Japan a long-term policy initiative described in white papers tends to have more chance 
of actually being carried out over the long term than it would in Britain. 
Thesis Organization 
Chapter II of this thesis will compare and contrast the two countries from early 
recorded history up until the modern era, through the first half of the twentieth century.  
Until the advent of railways transport in both countries would be largely in private hands, 
the main contrast being the stronger overland alternatives available in premodern Britain 
as compared with Tokugawa Japan.  Chapter III will compare and contrast the fate of 
coastal shipping for freight transport in both island nations from 1945 to the present.  
Despite huge differences in the extent of government oversight in Britain as compared 
with Japan in the postwar era, in both countries coastal shipping will be seen to have 
thrived or suffered in large part due to levels of demand from freight shippers for the 
maritime mode’s special economic and technical strengths.  Chapter IV will examine 
passenger traffic around the coasts of both island nations, with a focus on the “lifeline” 
ferry services afforded to residents of the smaller islands, known as “offshore islands” in 
Britain and ritō in Japan.  These ferry services will appear in many ways to be the 
opposite of coastal shipping for freight, in that the passenger ferries are maintained due to 
social necessity despite their clearly uneconomic nature – they are unable to remain 
financially independent and must rely on heavy government subsidy.  Finally, Chapter V 
will show what remains of IWT, in postwar Britain and Japan.  Unlike coastal shipping, 
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which even today can compete with any overland transport mode purely on economic 
criteria, IWT was burdened with a host of technical issues that caused it to largely fade 
away under the specter of railways and motorized transport on roads.  However, as a 
waterborne mode IWT still has inherent strengths; it has been kept alive to some extent 
by various public and private institutions attempting to exploit those strengths. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORICAL CASE FOR WATER 
Introduction 
In the seventh century BCE Japan’s legendary first emperor, Jimmu, traveled by boat 
from the island of Kyushu to present-day Osaka in the Seto Inland Sea, where he battled 
for and won the country’s throne.  Several hundred years later, just before the start of the 
Christian era, Jimmu’s ninth successor Emperor Sujin issued orders that boats be built in 
all the nation’s provinces to take advantage of the superiority of travel on Japan’s coastal 
waters. 1  About the same time as Sujin, Julius Caesar described in his writings at least 
five different types of “Celtic” ships used along the coasts of Britain and in the nearby 
Atlantic. 2  The largest Roman outpost in Britain, Londinium (present-day London), 
however, was not on the coast but about forty-five miles inland along the River Thames.  
River transport has a similarly long pedigree in Japan, as in the case of the Empress Jitō 
(r. late seventh century CE), for whose new palace wood and other construction materials 
were shipped along the “Jimmu” route to the Inland Sea, then up the Yodo River to its 
tributaries the Uji and Kizu for the final float to Nara. 3 
In this way, early records show the importance of water transport to both island 
nations from early in their histories.  Traditional overland transport, either on foot, on 
horseback, or by horse-drawn cart or carriage, was far less efficient than its waterborne 
equivalent, and the island-nation geography of both countries was ideally configured to 
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take advantage of water’s greater efficiency.  The mountain spines running down the 
middle of Japan’s main islands led the majority of its population to live in lowland plains 
with relatively easy access to the coast.  The location of Japan’s earliest population 
centers of Kyoto and Osaka, clustered in Kinai around the Seto Inland Sea, meant that 
coastal shipping was both very convenient and assisted by the extensive waterway system 
of the Yodo River delta which flowed from Kyoto down into the Sea at Osaka.  In Britain 
the long, relatively slow rivers of the lowlands making up most of England enabled 
extensive inland transport networks from early times.  After a port network emerged 
along the British coastline in the high middles ages, coastal shipping around Britain grew 
in importance, but rivers continued to be important transport arteries, helped along by 
artificial improvements. 
This chapter will illustrate how water remained the preferred transport medium in 
both countries until the advent of efficient, speedy, high-capacity overland modes, first 
with railways starting in the 1820s and next with motor vehicles from the twentieth 
century on.  Even after the appearance of technically-improved overland transport, 
however, water’s inherent advantages for certain transport purposes have allowed it to 
remain in high demand with customers in both countries’ transportation networks in the 
modern era.  This ability to stay relevant in the face of strong modal competition was not 
due to luck or magic, but rather a result of physics and economics as discussed in the 
Introduction. 
Earliest CE Developments 
Roads in Medieval Britain were poor affairs, and could not compete with waterborne 
transport.  A horse, or even horse-drawn cart, was no match for a boat in carrying power 
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due to one simple fact:  there was less friction on water. 4  In the case of low-value bulk 
materials it was critical to keep shipping costs low, as these made up a relatively large 
share of the final market price.  Between 600 and 1600 CE in Britain ship capacities grew 
at a significant rate, allowing ship operators to keep costs down through economies of 
scale. 5  Ships plied the coastal seas and rivers of the country, bringing commodities such 
as fresh sea fish far inland. 6  Up to the eleventh century the majority of Britain’s ports 
were located inland, somewhat upstream from river mouths, to allow proximity to inland 
distribution centers and to give shelter from hostile ships on the sea.  Then between the 
eleventh and thirteenth centuries Britain saw phenomenal urban expansion due in large 
part to increasing international trade.  A noted example of this was the wine trade 
between Britain and France; shipping across the English Channel picked up significantly 
after the Norman Conquest of 1066, and by the thirteenth century wine was the principal 
commodity of commerce in ports such as Bristol. 7  The increased flow of products from 
overseas led to larger ships that had more trouble sailing upstream on ever-silting rivers, 
so a fundamental shift occurred in the country’s urban structure:  most of the port system 
shifted out to the coasts.  While some river improvements and diversions were made to 
accommodate river travel, 8 coastal shipping around the new ring of port towns grew in 
importance.  Grain moved extensively by coastal routes, with large shipments between 
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Yorkshire and London as early as 1351. 9  The Port of Southampton already had a large 
coastwise trade in salted herrings in the 1420s, to and from locations such as Suffolk, 
Norfolk, and Newcastle. 10  This shipping activity was overwhelmingly in private hands, 
as attested to by the fact that the King’s own maritime fleet consisted only of warships 
and not cargo carriers because in the event of need for more ships he could rely on 
conscription of private cargo vessels. 11 
Japan witnessed similar growth in shipping.  When the country was united in the mid-
seventh century CE under the central control of the Ritsuryō Kokka, the government 
developed the ekisei, an overland horse-relay system, to help it centralize its power. 12  
Given the increased size of the new united territory, however, the government needed to 
use water transport to keep in touch with regions on the outer fringes.  During this era 
ships began to go as far north as Tōhoku, the northern extreme of Honshū. 13  The new 
government had centralized tenure over all land in Japan, and farmers working the land 
were required to send a tax or “tribute” to the central government every year, usually in 
the form of heavy bulk produce such as rice or other crops.  This type of cargo was sent 
by boat whenever possible, through government shipping agents using corvée to man 
vessels. 14  From the early eighth century the government shifted to a system of private 
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land tenure, in part to assist religious institutions. 15  As the land fractured into a plethora 
of private estates, or shōen, taxes bound for the government decreased but shipping 
remained busy as the taxes now went from the various estates to their respective 
proprietors (ryōshu), mostly absentees living in the Kyoto-Osaka area.  As with the taxes 
bound for government coffers, tribute from shōen, known as nengu, was most easily 
moved on water, along the coasts to the Seto Inland Sea and then either overland or by 
river from the coast to Kyoto.  The former private shipping agents now became private 
entrepreneurs, selling their services and employing wage labor rather than enforcing 
corvée. 16  Chronicles from the 920s CE already document sea routes between nineteen 
provinces and the capital, 17 and by the early thirteenth century law codes were dealing 
with shipping-related issues such as how to prevent the theft of cargo from vessels run 
aground in storms. 18  By the fifteenth century the Seto Inland Sea commercial economy 
could boast the annual passage of thousands of cargo-carrying vessels back and forth 
across the length of the Sea, 19  whose coastline, by this time, was dotted with port cities 
and merchant houses. 20 
What this shows is that whether under government or private control, waterborne 
transport in both early Japanese and British history was chosen by public and private 
customers because of its technical advantages over land transport, not because 
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government dictated its use.  In fact, in Japan by the sixteenth century government itself, 
namely the shoguns and daimyō (provincial chiefs), were dependent on autonomous “sea 
lords” for domestic maritime operations. 21  The ultimate water-transport entrepreneurs of 
the period, sea lords were the descendants of pirates who earlier had branched out from 
“protection” services into the management of littoral shōen for absentee ryōshu. 22  They 
dominated shipping routes in the Inland Sea 23 and elsewhere.  Officials had no choice 
but to accept this dependence because coastal transport was so important.  Leading sea-
lord bands such as the Noshima Murakami, which numbered over one thousand heads at 
the peak of their power in the 1580s, would even sell their services to both sides of a 
conflict where possible, because they knew their “clients” had no choice but to rely on 
them anyway. 24 
Premodern Developments 
Coastal shipping reached its pre-railway zenith at roughly the same time in both 
Britain and Japan.  Shortly after Tokugawa Ieyasu reunited, in 1600, a Japan reeling from 
the effects of a century of civil war, his family successors closed the country to maritime 
voyages abroad and to virtually any other contact with the outside world, 25 yet they 
realized the importance of domestic waterborne transport and encouraged it. 26  Regular 
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coastal routes soon covered virtually all of Japan’s coastline.  In Britain coastal shipping 
traffic grew by leaps and bounds during the Industrial Revolution, starting in the second 
half of the eighteenth century.  This shipping facilitated the distribution of coal, the main 
fuel of the Revolution, and of grain, needed more and more to feed the rapidly-increasing 
population. 
The core economic zone at the beginning of the Tokugawa era was the lowland plain 
of Kinai, as it had been for almost a millennium.  The zone then began to stretch eastward 
and northward along Honshū’s Pacific coast, first along the Nobi lowland plain (present-
day Nagoya) and finally reaching the Kantō plain, Japan’s largest, on which was founded 
the urban center of Edo, the Tokugawa shogunate’s capital.  This resulting area, 
encompassing Osaka and Edo at alternate ends, was known as the “Tōkaidō,” or “Eastern 
Seaway.”  Both coastal and inland-transport routes grew with increased movement along 
the Tōkaidō. 27  While this was the most busy area for transport, coastal shipping, inland 
water transport (IWT), and road networks also joined Edo with the castle towns of the 
various daimyō across Japan. 
The first big Tokugawa-era coastal-shipping links were forged between Edo and 
Osaka at the very beginning of the era.  Besides all the rice collected from farmers as 
taxes and then redistributed by the shogunate and daimyō to their retainers as 
compensation, coasters began carrying high quantities of sake between the two cities, 
then later other staples such as soy sauce, sugar, and vinegar.  Rice shipments increased 
into Edo to feed the rapidly-growing population, and by 1673 coasters were circling all of 
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Japan excepting parts of Kyushu. 28  Rice and other products continued to pour into Edo 
from all around Japan, moved primarily by coastal vessels. 
Inland water transport had a strong role as well in Tokugawa times.  From early in the 
era the daimyō began reclaiming and dredging rivers, as well as building canals, to 
increase cultivable land through more extensive irrigation networks.  These infrastructure 
efforts, especially river improvements, also helped to facilitate transport of cargo such as 
rice.  Construction of new river banks simplified loading and unloading of freight onto 
and off of boats. 29  Most Japanese rivers were not ideal for navigation as they “flow[ed] 
fast and short out of mountain ranges running along the country’s spine,” 30 but transport 
was made possible through the efforts of the daimyō as well as by the use of various 
types and sizes of boats.  Small boats would start far upstream and cargo would be 
reloaded into larger boats downstream where the rivers widened.  Similar to the early 
history of coastal trade in Japan discussed above, the daimyō river shipping economy 
spawned a cadre of shipping entrepreneurs.  Daimyō would entrust handling of their river 
freight to “river-bank agents” who directed boat owners and operators, as well as 
stevedores in the loading and unloading of cargo.  Some agents began to buy the boats 
themselves and doubled as ship owner/operators.  Besides the official daimyō freight they 
would also carry passengers and cargo from “commoners.” 31 
The two cities under direct shogunate control, Osaka and Edo, became foci of inland 
waterway activity, possible because they both were located in lowland plain areas, on the 
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coast, with few deviations in altitude.  Tokugawa shoguns encouraged merchants to 
cluster in Osaka to form a national rice market.  Osaka was turned into a huge network of 
canals augmenting the Yodo, with flat-bottomed boats transporting cargo and passengers 
around it all. 32  Tokugawa Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa shogun, had his new capital, Edo, 
planned and built with waterways as an integral part of the design.  He used existing 
rivers, as well as canals he had constructed, to mark off different quarters of the town, to 
enable oceangoing boats to penetrate further into the city before handing off their cargo 
to local lighters, and to serve as natural barriers to the spread of flames in the case of fire. 
33     
In Britain the coming of the Industrial Revolution in the late 1700s marked the pre-
railway high point of water transport.  Coal, the key fuel for the steam engines driving 
new automated factories, constituted on average over 40% of total coastwise shipping 
cargo between 1779 and 1829, absolute quantities growing from 1.5 million tons up to 
5.5 million in the same period. 34  Between 1791 and 1841 coastal trade as a whole 
multiplied roughly three times in volume. 35   Coasters were popular in passenger 
transport as well, especially for holiday travel as a new middle class gained discretionary 
income. 36 
Between 1660 and 1750 river improvements had already increased IWT navigation 
mileage from 685 to almost 1400 miles, leaving the majority of lowland England within 
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fifteen miles of a waterway. 37  Britain’s economy was growing so rapidly, however, that 
IWT soon hit a plateau and needed to evolve to continue growing.  Private businessmen 
and investors as well as local public bodies began to cut their own waterways, by 
building canals.  Between 1761 and 1830 IWT navigation mileage was again extended, 
this time to over 4000 miles. 38  Canals not only acted in a supplementary role to rivers, 
as connections between inland points and the coastline, but were also major 
thoroughfares for bringing coal from inland collieries to inland factories.  In fact, the 
explosion of canals was responsible for a phenomenon described as “turning the economy 
'outside-in':”  whereas up to 1760 the most populous urban centers in Britain were all 
coastal, 39 by the twilight of canal construction in 1830 five of England's seven largest 
cities were located “on inland coalfields.” 40  This kind of locational shift would not have 
been possible in Japan, as the habitable lowland plains along the coastline are too narrow 
to support such extensive canal networks penetrating far inland. 
The premodern explosion of waterborne transport in both island nations thus was 
driven by private initiative looking for greater economic advantages in transport.  In 
Japan even daimyō efforts to promote infrastructure improvements can be considered 
quasi-private because in their own domains the daimyō were largely autonomous from 
the central shogunate government regarding economic matters. 41  The vast majority of 
Britain’s river and canal projects were funded through joint-stock corporations, often by 
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local businessmen (and less frequently by local landowners) who stood to reap rewards in 
their business ventures through the added convenience of the new or improved waterways. 
42  A notable example of this trend was the pottery and tableware magnate Josiah 
Wedgwood, who in the 1770s latched on to the canal idea as a way to transport his 
product without breakage, which “straw-filled crates on pack-horses could never 
guarantee.” 43  While local public bodies might invest in canal schemes that affected their 
home regions, central government stopped short of direct investment, going no further 
than offering loans to interested private investors. 44  The fact that such capital-intensive 
projects were undertaken through private initiative and management speaks volumes 
about the value placed on waterborne transport. 
The Advent of Modern Land Transport 
In 1663 a Turnpike Act authorized local public bodies in Britain to assess tolls on 
users of roads in their territory in order to fund maintenance and improvement of the 
thoroughfares.  This launched rapid road improvements, bolstered by a series of 
engineers working from the 1760s on methods for improving road surfaces. 45  Stage 
coaches emerged to offer new passenger and freight services.  By the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century almost every town within a 25-mile radius of London was accessible 
from the capital by stage coach. 46  By the end of the eighteenth century pack horses and 
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mule caravans began to fade away, replaced by stage coach wagons, 47 and passenger 
transport boomed.  While not a substitute for water in the transport of heavy bulk freight, 
and not even necessarily faster than coasters, stage coaches had an advantage over IWT 
and coastal shipping which made them attractive for moving lightweight, high-value 
goods:  they could stick to timetables.  The one “fatal flaw” of coastal shipping was that 
the boats were sail-powered and thus at the whim of the weather.  If winds failed to 
cooperate, the ships might find themselves stuck in harbor even for weeks at a time.  
Stage coaches, on the other hand, could travel in virtually any weather and thus could be 
expected to arrive on schedule. 48  So for much of the period of the Industrial Revolution 
Britain had a two-tiered transport system:  1)  stage coaches for small, high-value goods 
going to and from points not near the coasts; and 2)  coastal shipping or IWT for 
everything else. 49 
The Tokugawa bakufu revived the ekisei horse-relay system, expanding it into the 
Gokaidō road network.  This system of five main roads, eight auxiliary roads, and close 
to 250 post stations, was created not with cargo transport as its focus, but rather as a way 
to secure the bakufu edict of sankin kōtai, whereby daimyō were required to alternate 
attendance between their regional seats of power and the shogunal court in Edo, the latter 
at which their families lived full-time.  Frequent travel of the daimyō and their retinue 
along these roads meant that the post stations were prioritized for their free use, including 
changes of horses and overnight stay.  Commoners used the road system as well for both 
commercial and recreational travel.  If they were lucky to arrive at the post stations at 
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times of low activity, they could use the facilities, albeit at a cost.  Japan, however, never 
developed a two-tiered transport system as in Britain because the horse cart and wagon 
failed to bridge the gap between the Asian continent and the Japanese islands.  Freight 
was carried overland on one’s back, on horseback, or by pack animals.  In the ekisei, 
horses had to be exchanged at each post station.  This required the frequent transferring 
of cargo between animals, which greatly increased the chances for wear or breakage and 
made overland cargo transport very inconvenient.  The roads themselves were in much 
poorer shape than in Britain as the bakufu, primarily concerned with roads as a device for 
enabling the sankin kōtai, saw no need to improve road surfaces for commerce, especially 
as the horse-drawn vehicles so common in Britain did not exist in Japan.  Construction of 
better roads was also handicapped by a shogunal prohibition against bridges over large 
rivers, in the interest of territorial defense. 50 
For these reasons water transport was used in Japan as the “default” shipping mode 
wherever possible.  Even in Britain, which had a viable overland alternative, transport on 
water was still the default.  It would take an even more efficient overland mode to really 
challenge water.  The answer was to apply the low-friction concept, which made ships so 
efficient, to land.  At first wood-, and later iron-wheeled, coal-filled cars were pulled by 
animals along tracks between British factories or collieries and waterway banks. 51  
Under the constant tinkering of Industrial-Revolution-era British inventors, the steam 
engine, invented in 1698 and first used to pump water out of coal mines, would a century 
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later be ready for trial in “mobile” applications. 52  A steam-powered car, or locomotive, 
was now used to pull the coal cars across the tracks in lieu of animals.  The first 
commercial railway application of this new technology came in 1825. 53  For the next few 
decades railways spread slowly, their traffic consisting at first mostly of passengers. 54  
By the 1850s steam trains were carrying greater volumes of freight than the canals. 55  
Canal traffic thenceforth petered out quickly, as did long-distance goods transport on 
roads, although the horse-drawn carriages found a new role as door-to-door shuttles 
between railway stations and surrounding homes and businesses. 56  Canals were rife with 
technical issues that had proved only a nuisance while overland transport had remained 
so primitive.  With the competition of railways these issues turned fatal for canals. 57  
Canal transport was slow, especially so because of complicated lock systems at level 
transitions that on average allowed only one boat to pass through every ten minutes. 58  
The “national” network comprised a myriad of unintegrated, privately-owned segments; 
through-traffic was often impossible because canals with different owners were built to 
differing technical standards and most owners had no interest in through freight 
agreements. 59  Moreover, it was not uncommon for canals to freeze in the winter. 60  
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Finally, railways responded quickly to canal competition, forming through-freight 
agreements and other partnerships, and even buying out much of the surviving canal 
infrastructure. 61   
At the end of the Nineteenth Century coastal shipping remained the only transport 
mode in Britain still competitive with railways for long-distance transport of cargo such 
as coal, grain, iron ore, china clay, bricks and timber, fodder and manure. 62  In 1910 
coastal shipping was still moving 59% of all freight (by ton miles), whereas railways 
were at 39% and canals down to 2%. 63  Coasters were able to remain competitive not 
only due to all their advantages as previously discussed, but also because they had finally 
surmounted their “fatal flaw” – susceptibility to the weather.  About a decade earlier than 
railways, in 1812 the coaster Comet became the first commercial steam-powered 
transport conveyance. 64  Early steamships were slow, unreliable, and gobbled up coal. 65  
As with railways, however, steam-engine technology advanced rapidly, allowing ships to 
run at high speed in virtually any weather so they could finally stick to timetables.  By the 
second half of the nineteenth century coastal “liner” services, which ran around the 
British coasts from port to port on set schedules, became popular for both passengers and 
freight alike. 66  While steam was tried in IWT and gained some popularity on riverboats, 
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the new engine technology was not able to lift canal shipping to a level where it could 
truly compete with rail. 67 
Officials of Japan’s new Meiji government, taking power in 1868, felt it urgent that 
Japan transform itself into a modern, industrialized country as quickly as possible; until 
such a task was complete the nation would be vulnerable to the Western Powers already 
arriving at its shores – Britain, USA, and others. 68  Under impetus from government and 
private-industry advocates, railways debuted in Japan in 1872 but caught on quite slowly, 
largely due to heavy competition from coastal shipping. 69  While early rail lines were 
built through the Tōkaidō plain district to connect inland industrial centers such as Tokyo 
with sea ports, or to connect Kinai and Kantō, Japan’s largely mountainous geography 
and frequent river flooding put practical limits on where rail lines could go. 70  Railways 
would go through alternate waves of government and private ownership and investment, 
until the whole network was nationalized in 1906. 71  Meanwhile the Meiji government 
and private industry were pushing Japanese coastal shipping into the modern era.  The 
government acquired steam technology through the purchase of foreign ships.  
Alternately, former daimyō who had purchased steam ships to support their own 
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territories before the Meiji era, entrusted those ships to the new government. 72  After two 
purely state attempts at coastal shipping failed miserably, the government turned over its 
whole coaster fleet to the most successful of the many independent private shippers of the 
time, the Mitsubishi Company (Mitsubishi Shōkai), and heavy government subsidies 
allowed Mitsubishi to undercut foreign competition in Japan’s waters, forcing them out 
so Mitsubishi could become a de facto monopoly by the mid-1870s.  During the next two 
decades the government and smaller private coastal shipping companies pushed massive 
consolidation in the industry. 73  After the government passed laws in 1896 giving 
impetus to Japanese shipbuilding and encouraging a shift to overseas maritime routes, the 
biggest shipping companies began to convert to deep sea routes, but many small, 
independent companies remained in Japan’s coastal waters. 74 
Coastal shipping remained dominant in domestic Japanese freight carriage even as it 
converted over from sail to steam, because it was ideally suited to serve the newly arising 
Meiji industry.  Factories in these industrial centers required great amounts of coal to 
power their steam-driven machines.  Unlike Britain in the era of industrialization, where 
many factories situated themselves in close proximity to coal fields and the canal system, 
in Japan the coal had to be brought from far-away mines located in areas inhospitable to 
industrial development.  Since this was long-distance haulage of bulk material, and the 
new industrial centers were all located on or near deep-water ports that could 
accommodate the new steam ships, coastal shipping was naturally the first choice for 
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transport. 
These new industrial centers arose through a fortuitous combination of circumstances.  
Tokugawa era had seen strong agricultural and population growth from its beginnings, 
but by the first half of the eighteenth century that growth started to slow down. 75  With 
specialization of labor a wave of proto-industry then arose, first in and around Osaka, and 
later spreading through the Tōkaidō district up to Edo.  When the Meiji government 
began to push “inorganic,” i.e. coal- and steam-based, industry, the former proto-
industrial centers – Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Tokyo, and Yokohama – re-emerged as the 
leaders in early industrial centers.  They were able to do this because the organic proto-
industrial production based on wood and water power was complementary, not 
competitive, with inorganic industry.  The two even shared much of the same labor force 
at similar wages, mostly young women arriving from farms.  These centers had strong 
concentrations of merchants and artisans from pre-Meiji days, which helped push trade in 
their areas.  They also benefited from trade engendered by foreigners, who by and large 
settled there because the centers were all located on or near deep-water ports that could 
accommodate the foreigners’ deep-hulled steam ships.  Nagoya, one of the proto-
industrial centers, failed to convert over to inorganic industry because it lacked a deep-
water port.  Foreigners were basically locked into these locations because they were 
“treaty ports,” small territories within which foreigners enjoyed extraterritorial legal 
status. 76 
At about the same time horse-drawn carts were introduced to Japan, and took up the 
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same role as in Britain:  short jaunts between train stations and surrounding homes and 
businesses. 77  So entering the twentieth century, the multimodal transport network was 
quite similar in both island nations, at least in form if not in degree:  1) overland transport 
led by railways, especially at long distances; 2) road conveyances, including horse-drawn 
carts, bicycles, and even rickshaws in Japan, carrying a growing amount of short-distance 
urban traffic, much of it clustered around train stations; and 3) coastal shipping, which 
continued to handle much of the long-distance freight transport, especially that for heavy, 
bulk loads.  While railways in Japan would not even reach the same magnitude of track 
length as in Britain until just before WWI, or the same magnitude of freight traffic until 
the 1920s, 78 Japanese railways, where available, were still preferable to most road 
transport.  Horse-drawn carriages, still relatively new to Japan, cut further into IWT 
shipping traffic, as motor vehicles did in both countries. 79  For Japan the effects of the 
latter may have been due more to actual infrastructure support for the vehicles than to the 
vehicles themselves.  The country’s roads, still in “ancient” condition at the start of the 
twentieth century, finally began to receive significant funding with the explosion of road 
conveyances in the Meiji Era.  For Japan, however, road construction equated to river 
reclamation, as frequent river floods would threaten any new roads, and Japan’s ancient 
tracks still had old, antiquated bridges or none at all.  Through an 1896 River Law, 
reclamation led to many river improvements that were actually inimical to transport on 
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the water. 80 
Then in the first half of the twentieth century domestic water transport would face 
damage in both countries for the opposite reason that it had flourished previously through 
history:  its economic attractiveness to shippers would be compromised, by direct 
government actions and/or interventions during wartime.  Japan faced a series of wars,  
first the Sino-Japanese of 1895, then the Russo-Japanese of 1905, and finally World War 
I.  The government’s divided loyalties from the 1890s on – military versus economic 
presence on the world stage – led to a chaotic cycle of peaks and troughs in the Japanese 
shipping industry for the next few decades.  Beginning with the Sino-Japanese conflict, 
strong state promotion of domestic shipbuilding was countered by the navy’s initial 
seizure of all existing tonnage for use in the conflict. 81  Shipping operators were able to 
avail themselves of state aid to make up the deficit in tonnage, but once the war with 
China ended the flood of requisitioned ships returned by the Navy to their owners led to 
rampant oversupply in the domestic market.  The resulting fierce competition for 
shipping traffic brought a free fall in prices and hence a recession to the industry.  
Operators inched towards recovery through control of tonnage capacity, but then the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1905 brought another round of naval confiscation and the whole 
cycle repeated itself. 82  In World War I a third cycle reached new levels of intensity:  
when German U-boats decimated a large part of the Allied shipping fleet 83 Britain and 
other leading western shipping powers virtually halted all non-war-related water-
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transport services; Japanese companies were happy to step in and take their place.  Even 
though in 1910 fully 99.2% of cargo/passenger ships and 89% of tonnage making entries 
into Japanese ports were domestic coastal-shipping vessels, 84 the WWI period saw a 
rapid worldwide expansion of Japanese shipping routes as well as tonnage capacity:  
from 1905 to 1919 Japan went from sixth to third on the world list of largest ship-owning 
countries.  This oligopoly situation allowed Japanese shipping to increase its rates, both 
internationally and domestically.  Improved shipbuilding technology such as diesel 
engines also helped the industry. 85  But true to the cyclical pattern, at the end of WWI 
the major western players hurried to retake their former shipping glory, creating strong 
competition for Japanese firms, who found themselves once again saddled with a large 
oversupply of capacity. 86  Those firms still standing in the 1920s had to face the 
subsequent worldwide depression of the 1930s in a weakened state. 87 
During WWI the British government asserted its right, provided by an Act from the 
1880s, to seize control of railways.  The private railway companies were paid flat rates 
for operating their rail lines per government instructions. 88  In the same period, however, 
the government, while requisitioning some deep-sea ships for the war effort, left the 
coastal-shipping industry alone because it judged that the plethora of small, independent 
ships would be too difficult to administer. 89  Operating costs began to increase rapidly 
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during this period for all transport modes.   Rail could keep its rates constant due to 
government payments, whereas coastal shipping, always independent, had to pass along 
cost increases to customers in the form of higher rates.  Thus the government transferred 
a good deal of freight from coastal shipping to rail to get a better deal.  As a result 
coastal-shipping traffic volumes were cut in half between 1913 and 1918. 90  During the 
same period canal traffic volumes fell significantly as well, by a full third. 91  Many 
canal-boat workers went off to war, leaving the boats out of operation. 92  After the war 
corporate consolidation allowed the coastal-shipping industry to survive and inch back to 
health.  Canals, however, already in such a weak financial state, were hit by a new wave 
of short-distance competition from motor vehicles, so many of the artificial waterways 
were closed down or fell into disuse in the interwar years. 93 
Conclusion 
This chapter’s narrative has shown how water transport held an exalted position 
throughout most of the recorded history of Japan and Britain.  Coastal shipping was ideal 
for their island-nation geographies, especially given the inefficiency of overland 
alternatives.  IWT was widely used on each country’s extensive river networks, and later 
on artificial waterways cut to extend those networks.  While featuring advantages of a 
water mode, such as low friction and high carrying capacity, IWT in Britain was replete 
with seemingly irrelevant technical issues that became fatal once IWT had to compete 
with the truly efficient overland modes of railways and motorized transport on roads.  In 
                                                
90  Ibid., 289. 
 
91  Ibid., 289-90. 
 
92 Hadfield, British Canals, 295. 
 
93 Dyos and Aldcroft, British Transport, 289-90. 
 37  
Japan as well IWT had difficulty competing with the attractive new overland transport 
modes.  However, coastal shipping must be seen as the star of the show.  The two island 
nations’ geographies, very similar in many respects, are virtually tailor-made for coastal 
shipping, which survived against all overland challenges up to World War II.  Coastal 
shipping has all the advantages of IWT without all of the nagging issues. 
As long as overland transport was slow and inefficient, water transport was preferred 
due to its technical and economic advantages, not because government favored its use.  
With the coming of railways, and later motor vehicles, customers had a choice of 
efficient transport modes.  Coastal shipping, though, continued to thrive thanks to the 
same technical and economic advantages it had always offered.  This was true both in 
laissez-faire private-industry-friendly Britain, where coastal shipping was virtually 
untouched by government up until WWII, and in Japan, where the coastal-shipping 
industry was the target of heavy government intervention.  For coastal shipping to lose its 
bread-and-butter bulk freight would require “artificial” government intervention.  During 
WWI in Britain the military apparatus worried that coastal shipping would be too hard to 
control for wartime purposes because the industry consisted of a plethora of small- and 
medium-sized independent operators.  However, by setting rail rates arbitrarily low and 
then moving huge amounts of freight traffic from coasters to trains to take advantage of 
those rail rates, the military harmed the coastal shipping industry without any direct 
intervention.  During three wartime eras in Japan – 1895, 1905, and WWI – the military 
did intervene directly in the coastal shipping industry by confiscating ships, which 
wreaked havoc on the industry’s tonnage supply, rendering operators less able to respond 
to customer demand for freight carriage. 
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Chapters III - V will explore how waterborne transport has fared in post-WWII 
Britain and Japan.  Of particular concern will be the ferocious competition of motorized 
road transport once its scale graduates to the same distance as railways.  Technological 
improvements in both countries will precipitate shifts in patterns of industrial production 
and commercial distribution, again shifting the balance between road, rail, and water. 
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CHAPTER III 
COASTAL FREIGHT SHIPPING 
Introduction 
Chapter II’s main goal was to show that water transport had a “natural” role to play in 
the island nations of Japan and Britain; due to their geographies the two countries were 
ideally suited for coastal shipping, and inland water transport (IWT) was also historically 
active on their many rivers and canal systems.  There was high demand for water 
transport in both Britain and Japan, primarily because of its economic advantages rather 
than due to effects of government policy or intervention.  In fact, government 
interference, in the form of military control, was shown to hurt water transport’s fortunes 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  For long-distance trips water 
transport modes were more efficient, offered more convenience, and were lower in cost 
than any overland alternatives until the advent of railways in the nineteenth century.  
Subsequently IWT largely succumbed to overland transport competition, while coastal 
shipping continued to dominate the long-distance bulk transport segment of the economy.  
The British government, traditionally a fan of laissez-faire economics and private 
industry, allowed competition between rail and shipping to remain in private hands 
throughout the nineteenth century.  In Japan, where the modern shipping industry was 
created almost simultaneously with the debut of railroads around the 1870s, both sectors, 
while nominally private in ownership and operation, were the recipient of heavy 
government influence and intervention from their beginnings.  Despite the vastly 
different levels of government involvement in Britain and Japan, a similar picture was 
seen in both vis-à-vis coastal shipping:  railways quickly took over a large share of 
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transport traffic after their introduction, notably passenger traffic, but rail had difficulty 
challenging coastal shipping in its area of greatest strength, namely, the long-haul 
transport of heavy bulk goods such as coal or grain.  It was only through the effects of 
direct government action in wartime, from about 1896 in Japan and from 1914 on in 
Britain, that coastal shipping would appear (temporarily) less economically attractive to 
shippers than rail.  IWT traffic would decline further in the face of road transport in the 
twentieth century, especially in Japan where an 1896 River Law pushing reclamation to 
help roads through flood control and bridge building would hurt rivers’ potential as 
transport arteries.   
This chapter will continue the story of coastal shipping in the post-WWII era up to 
the present, in the face of competition from rail but also from the newest overland 
competitor, motorized road transport.  Road transport’s main advantages over water, 
namely speed and the ability to go anywhere on land, are exactly the advantages railways 
held over IWT in the previous century, yet motor vehicles on the road raised the 
competitive threat to an even higher level.  It will be shown here how motorized road 
transport will go on to largely replace even rail’s market in both countries for both 
passenger and freight traffic, while coastal shipping will hold its own in its areas of 
natural advantage.  In postwar Britain the government will continue its standard policy of 
benign neglect towards coastal shipping, whereas Japan’s government will maintain 
heavy involvement in, and oversight of, the nominally-private industry. 
Coastal shipping in postwar Japan will achieve a much higher “market share,” i.e. 
share of total domestic freight transport, than in Britain.  I argue that this is less a product 
of closer government oversight of the industry than it is of other factors.  First of all, I 
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will illustrate how fortuitous initial circumstances gave coastal shipping a much stronger 
jump-start in Japan than in Britain in the immediate postwar years.  Once the situation of 
coastal shipping is specified for each country in the immediate postwar years, the 
remainder of the discussion in this chapter will take the situation at that time as the 
“initial conditions” from which the comparative development of coastal shipping in the 
two countries will be assessed.  Extraordinary economic growth in postwar Japan, 
especially through the mid-1970s, will allow coastal shipping to maintain the excellent 
initial conditions even to the present day, as a very large share of the domestic transport 
market.  Britain’s coastal-shipping industry will never obtain the high level of market 
share seen in postwar Japan.  Britain’s relatively slow, steady post-WWII economic 
growth will allow its coastal shipping industry to maintain roughly its initial conditions 
up to the present day, while advancing beyond this initial postwar state for a relatively 
brief interval as a consequence of a temporary “chance windfall” in the economy.  
Coastal shipping’s market share will still remain significantly lower in Britain than in 
Japan throughout the postwar period.  In both countries, fluctuations in coastal-shipping’s 
freight market share track developments in the nations’ economies as a whole.  The 
choices of private shipping operators and customers will cause changes in freight share 
much more than any government action.  As a notable example, in line with a 
phenomenon called “modal shift,” both countries’ governments in the 1990s will attempt 
to transfer domestic freight from road to coastal shipping (and rail) once the post-WWII 
explosion of motorized road transport becomes associated with a variety of negative 
consequences to society.  These modal-shift efforts will be largely unsuccessful, due to 
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the rejection of the alternatives promoted by such efforts on the part of the private 
operators and customers, for whom such alternatives were found to be uneconomical. 
The “Initial Conditions” of Post-WWII Coastal Shipping 
WWII brought water transport under government control in both Britain and Japan, 
and the famous naval battles of both nations saw the destruction of massive numbers of 
ships.  In Japan the destruction was almost complete. 1  In Britain coastal liners suffered 
losses as they played the role of rescue duty in the long British convoys, 2 but the coastal 
tramp fleet was left largely intact.  Coastal liners had provided the last coastal passenger 
traffic in prewar Britain; with the large-scale destruction of these ships most owners gave 
up on resuming service after WWII.  This meant the near demise of coastal passenger 
transport 3 except for a handful of companies which eked out “mini-cruise” services, 
targeted at the vacation market, until the early 1970s. 4  In Japan coastal passenger 
transport was down to only 2.2% of all domestic passenger transport in 1950, and this 
share would drop further, going below 1% for most of the postwar period.  For these 
reasons this chapter will restrict its discussion to coastal freight transport, while what 
remained of coastal passenger traffic will be covered in Chapter IV. 
Britain and Japan, both strong economies before WWII, would not waste time 
rebuilding that strength after the cessation of hostilities.  Britain’s new postwar Labour 
government under Clement Attlee embarked on a program of “industrial nationalization,” 
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5 which included the 1947 nationalization of virtually all transport except shipping. 6  By 
1947, total British national production for the economy as a whole was already back at 
110% of 1938 numbers, and a focus on the repair of transportation and communication 
infrastructure was aided by organized labor and their choice not to strike at all in the 
years of 1945-6.  Further gains in production would be made with the help of funds 
obtained through the Marshall Plan, and by 1951 national production totals were at 145% 
of 1938 levels. 7  As in postwar Germany, the leadership of the occupation forces in 
Japan (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP) initially had plans to hold 
the country back from large-scale recovery, fearing the rekindling of war sentiment.  By 
1947, however, SCAP thinking had changed.  Again similar to Germany’s case, the new 
SCAP plan was to help revive Japan to provide a strong bulwark against communism, the 
“threat” in this case coming not from the Soviet Union but rather from China and Korea 
on the Asian continent. 8 
Postwar Japan saw a grim transport reality:  railways had been decimated by Allied 
bombing raids, roads had yet to reach the modern expressway stage, and motor-vehicle 
parts and fuel were in short supply.  Shipping thus became the default transport mode for 
domestic freight. 9  This was the first step of coastal shipping’s big jump start after World 
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War II; the second step was a quick provision of ships for domestic transport purposes.  
SCAP’s original postwar thinking – the fear of lingering wartime sentiment – was very 
much focused on Japan’s shipping industry.  The occupation authorities believed that the 
industry as a whole was sympathetic to the war cause, and had gone as far as forbidding 
the Japanese government from reimbursing the industry for ships lost in the war, as a way 
to “confiscate” wartime profits. 10  Once SCAP changed its mind in 1947 about its plans 
for Japan’s overall redevelopment, it provided 215 ships for Japan’s use 11 but limited 
them to domestic transport, i.e. coastal shipping (international, or deep-sea, shipping 
would not be allowed again until the 1950s).  The Japanese government was now allowed 
to involve itself in the coastal-shipping industry and hit the ground running in 1947, 
initiating both the Ship Corporation (Senpaku Kōdan) and a Programmed Shipbuilding 
Scheme (PSS, or keikaku zōsen in Japanese) to help finance ship construction.  The 
keikaku zōsen provided up to 70% of funds to potential ship buyers, in a joint-ownership 
arrangement where private owners had the option of buying out the Ship Corporation’s 
share.  Until 1949, when it was disbanded, the Ship Corporation was virtually the sole 
means in Japan for potential ship owners to acquire the capital they needed for 
investment in coastal tonnage. 12  These ships benefitted from the Keisha Seisan Hōshiki 
(“Hōshiki”), which the Japanese government instituted in December 1946 to concentrate 
resources in a few key targeted national industries, such as coal and steel, under the belief 
that increased production in these areas would help lead growth for the economy as a 
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whole.  Not only were coal and steel ideal freight for coastal shipping, but the Hōshiki 
also happened to include orders to switch much cargo from the badly-damaged railways 
to sea. 13 
By 1950 coastal shipping in Japan already had a huge 41% share of all domestic 
freight transport, a level from which it would not deviate much up to the present. 14  Then, 
with the declaration of the Korean War in 1951 came the third and final step in Japanese 
coastal shipping’s impressive postwar jump-start.  The U.S. decided to use Japan as “in 
effect a military supply base” 15 instead of shipping war materiel in bulk from the United 
States. 16  The resulting huge intake of orders allowed the Japanese economy as a whole 
to climb mightily in a two-year period, up to 100% of prewar production levels by 1952, 
whereas production in 1945 had been at 10% of prewar levels.  Total domestic freight 
traffic (in all transport modes) rose 26.2% in ton-km between 1950 and 1955. 17  Profit 
margins in the coastal shipping industry increased strongly as a result:  profits of the 
twenty-four major shipping companies went from 1.7 billion yen in the second half of 
1950 to 5 billion yen in the first half of 1951, then up to 6 billion yen in the first half of 
1952. 18  The industry regained its prewar freight volume levels by 1955-56. 19  Yet in 
terms of domestic freight market share coastal shipping was down from 41% in 1950 to 
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35.7% in 1955.  The Korean War proved to be a boon for Japan’s railroads as well, which 
were needed for troop deployment and movement of materiel.  Both private and state-
owned rail lines were quickly rebuilt, and made strong technological progress during the 
period through conversion to electric power and improved diesel engine efficiency. 20  
We will take Japanese coastal shipping’s situation in 1955 as the initial conditions from 
which its development will be assessed in the remainder of this chapter. 
The post-WWII British coastal shipping industry did not have the jump start afforded 
to its Japanese counterpart, so its domestic freight market share never reached Japanese 
levels.  The British Government had two schemes for the postwar revitalization of the 
nation’s shipping fleet, both deep-sea and coastal.  First, from 1942 onwards it began 
taking orders for government-owned ships to be sold after the war to private concerns at 
cost less depreciation.  Second, a government tonnage replacement scheme helped return 
the value of lost ships to their former owners. 21  However, the part of Britain’s coastal 
fleet affected by wartime damage, namely coastal liners, were by and large not replaced 
in the postwar period as operators decided that total costs to restart services would be 
prohibitive. 22  The new Labour government not only left shipping out of its 1947 
nationalization of transport but did coastal shipping a big disservice when it transferred 
large shares of domestic coal shipments, the former coastal liners’ bread and butter, to its 
new nationalized darling, the railways, in an effort to pad the railways’ books. 23  Thus 
British coastal shipping began the postwar era with a much-reduced level of tonnage.  
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The few coastal liner services still remaining could not compete with rapidly-growing 
road transport. 24  Not surprisingly, the earliest postwar data available for British coastal 
shipping shows the transport mode’s share of domestic freight carriage at 16% in 1965, 
as opposed to Japan’s whopping 43.4% in the same year. 25 As that 1965 number is the 
earliest available data for postwar British coastal shipping, it will be taken as an 
indication of the industry’s initial conditions for purposes of this chapter.   
One might argue that Japanese coastal shipping’s jump start after WWII was the 
direct result of various government actions.  These were three:  1) the provision of ships 
by SCAP; 2) the PSS Program; and, 3) the Hōshiki.   However, although generous 
lending by the Japanese national government early on may certainly have helped the 
industry grow, the PSS program lasted only two years for coastal shipping, and “normal” 
post-war procedures would have reimbursed coastal operators for their lost ships anyway 
had SCAP not expressly forbidden such reimbursements.  In other words, without 
government actions 1) and 2) coastal operators would have been reimbursed anyway for 
ships lost during the war.  Of greater significance is the fact that regardless of tonnage 
capacity, ships will not carry freight or make money doing so unless freight is there to 
carry.  It was a historical accident that coastal shipping was favored in the immediate 
postwar years because other transport modes were in such a state of disrepair.  At the 
same time, coastal shipping was extremely useful in its own right.  Action 3), the Hōshiki, 
did happen to set priorities on industries whose output was ideal for coastal shipping, but 
it would be illogical to argue that the Hōshiki was set up solely – or even in part – for the 
purpose of spurring on coastal shipping.  Rather, the Hōshiki was designed to spur 
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growth in the economy in general.  Industries targeted by the Hōshiki produced growing 
quantities of materials for which coastal shipping happened to be the best transport mode.  
All these reasons show that government intervention was not the primary cause of coastal 
shipping’s successful jump start in early postwar Japan, although they do illustrate how 
economically useful coastal shipping is in island nations such as Japan. 
British coastal shipping’s relatively low share of domestic freight transport reflected 
low shipping tonnage following the due to the failure of the coastal-liner fleet to be 
restored.  The industry itself made a conscious decision to leave supply low after the war.  
As well, when the national government used rail to transport significant amounts of what 
had previously been prime coastal-shipping freight, namely coal, the government’s 
actions, despite their deleterious effects on the coastal shipping industry, did not actually 
constitute intervention in the industry per se.  Rather, the government took those actions 
as a transport operator in the transport market, so in this case coastal shipping was 
actually (negatively) affected by transport market developments rather than by 
government intervention.  The case is also another example of the British government’s 
historical neglect of coastal shipping, although in this case the neglect was not benign.  
Arguably, the Labour government did not specifically intend to harm coastal shipping, 
but rather the latter remained outside its field of vision.  The negative effects of its 
actions on coastal shipping were therefore not considered.  The Attlee governnment’s 
Transport Act of 1947 lends support to this claim.  While nationalizing most transport, 
the Act specifically mentions “transport by air” as except from nationalization, 26 but the 
text of the act makes no mention of coastal shipping as being included or excluded.  
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Instead, the document reserves the right for the government’s new British Transport 
Commission (BTC) to establish a special committee for no greater purpose that that of 
“co-ordinating the activities” of coastal shipping operators with the activities of the BTC. 
27  In other words, coastal shipping was so far removed from the BTC’s primary 
objectives that the BTC needed a special committee just for interfacing with the maritime 
transport mode.  Regardless of the BTC’s actions with respect to railways and coal, rail’s 
domestic freight market share in Britain would soon dry up in comparison with road 
haulage and coastal shipping.  In fact, by 1964, at the point of what I have established as 
British coastal shipping’s initial conditions, the railways would be losing market share 
and run into debt.  Thus in Britain’s case as well as Japan’s, the fortunes of the coastal 
shipping industry in the immediate postwar years were determined primarily by transport 
market forces rather than by government intervention. 
Postwar Economic Growth and Departure from the Initial Conditions 
Although the end of the Korean War brought a slowdown and recession to the 
Japanese economy, two strong economic growth periods between 1956-7 and 1959-61 
ushered in Japan’s “High (Economic) Growth Rate Period” ((Keizai) Kōdo Seichō-ki).  
Especially between 1952 and 1961, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI, or Tsūshō Sangyō-shō in Japanese) shifted the nation’s industrial focus from 
“light, labor-intensive industries to steel, ships and automobiles…” 28  Industry began to 
concentrate in the Pacific Belt Industrial Region, which ran along Japan’s Pacific 
coastline and included the four largest urban industrial centers:  Tokyo-Yokohama, 
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Nagoya, Osaka-Kobe, and Kita-Kyushu.  This followed more or less the pattern of the 
premodern Tokugawa era or that of the modern Meiji era, although after WWII the 
industrial heart was no longer confined to the Tōkaidō.  As in the earlier eras, waterside 
locations of these post-WWII industrial centers drove greater demand for coastal 
shipping, which was already handling much of the nation’s coal and steel output.  
Although railway reconstruction proceeded rapidly after the war, by 1960 coastal 
shipping became the dominant domestic freight carrier. 29  From the 1960s coastal 
shipping’s domestic transport market share would remain relatively constant up to the 
present day, while rail rapidly lost share to road transport especially from the 1960s on. 30  
Coastal shipping’s traffic increased steadily up to its peak ton-km share of 51% in 1973, 
31 whereas the railways went into debt from 1964 on 32 and begin a slide in freight market 
share from which they have yet to recover.  
While coastal shipping was gaining traffic and market share through the 1950s and 
1960s,  the industry saw problems on the horizon.  Not only had shipowners used the 
Korean-War boom to acquire new hulls, but also the huge demand for tonnage supply 
during the boom had convinced the government to redeploy fifty-seven WWII-era ships 
originally slated for scrapping. 33  As Japan’s shipping industry had experienced all too 
graphically in its ebb-flow cycles between the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and WWI (See 
Chapter II), oversupply of tonnage raised the specter of fierce competition amongst 
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operators for available traffic, which could lead to big rate cuts and low profitability.  The 
postwar entry of a plethora of new small operators into the industry made competition 
that much stronger. 34  By the mid-1960s the Japanese government felt it had to act to 
guard against ruinous competition.  The government’s main priority for transport in the 
High Growth Rate Period was to provide stable, reliable “mass-volume” service 35 so that 
the economy, based primarily on chemical and heavy industries such as steel, 36 could 
continue to grow at phenomenal rates.  Given this priority the government could not 
allow the coastal-shipping industry, relied upon for large bulk shipments of the heavy 
industrial materials needed for high economic growth, to again suffer ebb-flow cycles 
similar to those encountered between 1895 and WWI.  Thus from 1964 on the 
government ushered in a new major wave of intervention into the coastal shipping 
industry designed to “stabilize,” or circumscribe, tonnage supply.  The two main laws 
concerning coastal shipping were amended to allow the government to:  1)  control the 
tonnage supply active in the marketplace at any given time; 2) group all owners and 
operators into five industry associations for greater “cooperation;” and 3) establish rate 
cooperation amongst operators, that is, agreement among all operators to charge 
customers the same rates. 37  The centerpiece was the new Scrap and Build Program 
(Senpuku Chōsei Seido).  According to the Program, when a ship owner wished to 
dispose of a vessel it would receive from the government the right (hikiate ken or hikiate 
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shikaku) to purchase a new replacement ship.  Owners could then either hold on to the 
rights, which became valuable commodities like shipyard “store credits,” or others 
wishing to enter the business or to increase the size of their existing fleet could purchase, 
with government approval, a hikiate ken from an owner who was not interested in more 
tonnage. 38  Through these means the government effectively cartelized the coastal-
shipping industry, severely restricting competition through an actively-controlled supply 
of ships in the marketplace as well as standard rate schedules for each of the five industry 
groups represented by an association. 39 
Meanwhile, Britain was largely ignoring its coastal shipping industry.  Post-WWII 
government transport white papers barely mentioned either international or domestic 
maritime transport.  A 1966 white paper simply stated that “The Government sees no 
reason at present for suggesting any change in the general arrangements under which 
coastal shipping operates,” with no further explanation. 40   The first post-WWII 
government report devoted to shipping, published in 1970 by a committee appointed to 
the task by the President of the Board of Trade, found that postwar government policy 
vis-à-vis shipping was “essentially [one of] non-interference in commercial matters…” 41  
This non-interference carried over to the committee itself, as shown by its statement early 
in the report that “[m]ost of the [shipping] industry’s business is concerned with 
international trade…” 42  While the ostensible meaning of this statement was that the 
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Board of Trade was most interested in Britain’s import/export income earned through 
international shipping, the outcome was that coastal shipping received short thrift in the 
report.  The little coverage it did receive included a few statistics, a bit of history, and the 
conclusion that the transport mode “should operate in fair competition with inland 
transport systems and without special assistance.” 43  This report pointed out that the 
paucity of information was due in part to the fact that coastal-trade statistics were hard to 
come by, 44 a situation for which the cause was implied to be a “history of individualism” 
of the industry and its closed nature towards outsiders. 45  In other words, the British 
government admitted its distance from the coastal shipping industry, but blamed that fact 
on the industry itself. 
Coastal shipping’s share would reach its postwar peak in Japan in the 1970s at just 
over 50% of all domestic freight in ton-km, and then decline slowly over the next few 
decades but normally remain over the 40% level.  While coastal-shipping-specific data is 
not available for 1970s Britain, the share of domestic water transport overall saw a dip of 
a few percentage points in the 1970s versus 1965. 46  Responding to the maintenance of 
Japan’s much higher market share from the late 1960s on, one could argue that the 
government’s efforts, centered around the Scrap and Build Program, succeeded in 
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stabilizing the industry, letting it “get on with its job” without excessive competition 
amongst operators.  If we define “stabilization” as control of competition through control 
of supply, then the Scrap and Build Program may very well have stabilized the industry.  
However, by aiming at industry stabilization rather than growth, it may be argued that it 
held back the economy from a level of expansion it may otherwise have achieved.  
Japan’s peak coastal-shipping market share in 1973 coincides with the tail end of Japan’s 
High Growth Rate Period – usually accepted as running from 1955 through 1974 or so – 
and post-1973 share figures show year-on-year decreases reflecting recession in Japan’s 
economy following the 1973 Arab oil shock.  Clearly coastal shipping’s domestic freight 
market share rose and fell with the state of the economy even after the introduction of the 
Scrap and Build Program, and was already near its peak before the Program’s 
introduction.  As Japan’s economy grew, demand for coastal shipping would grow as 
well, and vice-versa when the economy shrank.  Japan’s postwar economic growth was 
absolutely phenomenal – its real GNP growth rate for the 1956-73 period was 10.2%, 
versus 5.5% for France, the next closest G7 country. 47  In the decade between 1965 and 
1974 Japan surpassed Germany to become the #2 country by GDP in the liberalized 
world, 48 despite the fact that the majority of the country, including virtually all major 
cities save Kyoto, had been razed to the ground by WWII Allied bombing runs including 
two atomic blasts.  That kind of rebuilding and industrial growth, focused on heavy large-
scale industry, translates to strong demand for the carrying power afforded by coastal 
shipping.  Britain, on the other hand, while the strongest Western-European economy 
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right after WWII in terms of per-capita GDP, was also the weakest in terms of growth 
rate of that same GDP in the decade between 1950 and 1960. 49  Britain’s real GNP 
growth rate averaged only 3.2% for the 1956-73 period. 50  While slightly behind Britain 
in 1955 in total domestic freight transport volume in ton-km, by 1960 Japan had already 
surpassed Britain and in the 1970s Japan’s volumes would grow to about 2.5 times those 
of Britain. 51  As compared with Britain, Japan’s main industies had higher demand for 
the domestic shipping of raw, heavy materials, so it is natural that Japan’s coastal-
shipping freight share would be so far above that of Britain as these types of materials 
usually move on coastal vessels.  Britain’s coastal-shipping traffic in the 1970s was 
overwhelmingly oil and coal 52 – fuels for energy production – whereas Japan’s coastal-
shipping freight mix between 1963 and 1967 included about 40% coal and petroleum 
products and the remainder materials for construction and manufacturing. 53 
In fact, there are two possible arguments regarding the effects of the Japanese 
government’s Scrap and Build Program in this time period.  The first argument, as given 
above, would say that circumscription of tonnage supply as effectuated by Scrap and 
Build reduced competition amongst operators and thus allowed them to remain relatively 
healthy (profitable).  This, in turn, helped to guarantee a steady supply of coastal-
shipping tonnage supply, enabling the maintenance of Japan’s overall economic growth 
without transport bottlenecks that might have held it back.  Since this is the scenario that 
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the Japanese government chose to follow, it appears that the government’s priority was to 
achieve a stable volume of coastal shipping tonnage supply.  The other argument, 
however, would be that since Scrap and Build effectively constrained coastal shipping 
supply within certain limits, the program may have actually prevented the coastal 
shipping industry from reaching its full potential.  If tonnage supply had been allowed to 
grow or shrink “freely” in concert with demand from shipping customers, the industry as 
a whole may well have transported a higher share of domestic freight than it did.  In other 
words, in its attempts to guarantee a sufficient supply of coastal-shipping tonnage, the 
government may have caused the opposite, i.e. a level of supply insufficient to meet 
actual customer demand.  Of course the answer to this counterfactual exercise will never 
be known, but these arguments cut to the heart of the broader economic debate of laissez-
faire versus government regulation.  Proponents of a laissez-faire economic system 
would have to admit that such a system includes the possibility of ruinous competition 
amongst service providers, but would counter that it offers those same providers the 
ability to respond quickly to customer demand, as well as the motivation to provide the 
best service possible in order to win the competition.  This means that the Japanese 
government, through Scrap and Build, may have been “asking” shipping customers to 
sacrifice some quality of service in order to ensure that a certain level of freight was 
always moving in the economy.  Overall economic growth was in any case presumably 
more important for Japanese officials than the fortunes of individual sectors such as that 
of coastal shipping owners and operators. 
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The 1970s and 1980s – Slowdown for Japan, Boom Period for Britain 
The mid-1970s saw a big inflection point in the world economy, first with the 
dissolution of the Bretton Woods accord removing the dollar from the gold standard, and 
then the first Arab oil shock of 1973.  Total domestic freight movements for Japan 54 
reflect a slowdown in economic growth in the first half of the 1970s under the nation’s 
biggest long-term recession since WWII. 55  The year 1974 actually saw negative 
economic growth for the first time since the war.  From 1975 Japan entered a decade now 
commonly called the “Era of Stable Growth” (Antei Seichō-ki) where the nation, 
especially after the second oil shock of 1979, began a society-wide shift from intensive 
heavy industrialization to the production of smaller-scale, higher-value products. 56  In 
part this was out of necessity:  Japan’s economy up to the mid-1970s focused on the 
chemical and heavy industries, especially petrochemicals and steel.  Both industries 
required huge amounts of energy, supplied mainly through imports of crude oil.  During 
the 1960s crude prices remained low, but rose alarmingly after the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
57  Between 1973 and 1983 “customs cleared” crude prices in Japan increased by a factor 
of ten.  Higher oil prices forced the shutdown and dismantling of petrochemical plant and 
equipment, as it also did for shipbuilding yards, heavily reliant on steel.  These 
developments helped to usher in more specialized industries such as electronics and 
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machinery, as well as service industries.  As a result total industrial energy consumption 
in Japan dropped almost 25 percent in the same 1973-83 period. 58 
For the first time since 1955 total domestic freight volumes leveled off, and actually 
dropped slightly, during the five-year period of 1980-85.  The country saw a strong move 
in the direction of high-frequency, small-consignment (“just-in-time”) transport as well 
as new services such as express home freight delivery.  As in premodern Britain these 
higher-value, shorter-distance freight deliveries tended to be the forte of rapid overland 
transport, in this case trucks, 59 rather than coastal shipping.  After 1980, while rail’s 
domestic freight share stayed roughly constant, coastal shipping’s share began to drop 
little by little while road’s share rose in inverse proportion, as if the latter two were 
exchanging shares directly. 60  This reflects the shift towards an economy where the 
relative strength of road hauling in servicing short-distance transport and distribution 
increased the demand for this type of transport.  Appendix A Chart 7 shows coastal 
shipping’s product mix for the years 1981-90 in Japan – there is clearly a greater 
diversity of products than in the five-year period of 1963-67.  Yet even in the later years 
the mix consisted primarily of raw, heavy, bulk materials.  This is what coastal shipping 
carries so economically so that is the business the market gives it.  A slow decline in 
coastal shipping’s freight share was occurring despite the fact that the government’s 
Scrap-and-Build program was alive and well.  In other words, market forces were guiding 
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demand for coastal shipping despite the government’s continued intervention in the 
supply side. 
One may look at the slow descent of Japanese coastal shipping’s freight share after 
1975 and wonder how significant this national shift in industry really was.  However, 
Appendix A Chart 9 should quell any doubts.  Even as Japan turned to a truck-based just-
in-time distribution model focusing on smaller, higher-value freight, long-distance ferry 
services had been growing rapidly since their debut in 1968. 61  By 1971 almost 50% of 
all coastal tonnage supply consisted of ferries. 62  While the quantity  of “standard” 63 
domestic freight trucks on the market exploded, more and more of them were making at 
least part of their journeys on ferries.  Thus, coastal shipping as an industry was able to 
substitute some of the mixed freight in trucks on ferries, for bulk-material traffic it was 
losing.  Of course, coastal shipping’s domestic freight share continued to drop despite the 
increased ferry traffic.  Apparently all the new freight on trucks could not compensate 
completely for losses in freight volume on other types of coastal vessels such as oil 
carriers. 
Britain faced quite a different situation from Japan in the 1970s and ‘80s.  Using new 
techniques invented in 1963 in the U.S., Britain began to drill deep-sea oil wells in the 
nearby North Sea, discovering oil and natural gas in 1964.  After the oil crisis of 1973 it 
was financially viable for British companies to explore further in the North Sea using 
these deep-sea methods.  Britain began to produce oil on its continental shelf in 1975, and 
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another surge in worldwide prices in 1979, after the second Arab oil shock, kept the UK 
offshore oil (and natural gas) industry booming until the mid-1980s.  Then worldwide 
prices began to fall again, cutting into profitability.  Unlike Japan, which was almost 
completely dependent on imports for its oil requirements, 64 during its oil boom Britain 
went from an energy importer to a net exporter.  Between 1973 and 1983 the country was 
the #2 natural gas producer in the world, and in 1983 it was the #5 oil producer 
worldwide.  The number of ships in the offshore supply industry went from 97 in 1973 to 
292 in 1986. 65 
Appendix A Chart 8 shows that in 1980 the total ton-km of British domestic freight 
carried by water was well over double the 1965 figure.  For the first (and last) time since 
WWII, the coastal shipping industry’s share of total domestic freight broke the 20% 
barrier for much of the 1980s, and peaked at over 25%. 66  This was despite that fact that 
production of coal, still a major cargo for coastal shipping at the end of the 1960s, 
declined as major coal consumers such as The North Thames and South Eastern Gas 
Boards switched over completely to North Sea gas by 1971. 67  At the same time road 
transport’s share of freight dropped a whole 10% between 1975 and 1980, 68 even though 
the actual ton-km carried stayed even during the same period. 69  This newfound product, 
oil, was being added directly to coastal shipping’s freight volumes while other modes’ 
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volumes stayed relatively constant, not surprising as heavy bulk products like oil are 
tailor-made for water transport. 
Transport developments of the 1980s in both Britain and Japan serve as an excellent 
illustration of the main thesis of this chapter:  that coastal shipping’s freight volumes and 
share of the transport market rise and fall in line with the state of the economy, regardless 
of government intervention or lack of it.  During this decade coastal shipping’s freight 
shares dropped in Japan despite the continuance of the Scrap and Build Program, as the 
economy shifted towards a distribution model more in tune with overland motor-vehicle 
transport.  Scrap and Build may have succeeded in stabilizing coastal shipping’s tonnage 
supply on the market, but it could not keep coasters’ domestic freight market share from 
rising and falling in line with customer demand as determined by the state of the 
economy.  In the same decade Britain saw its highest coastal-shipping freight shares of 
the postwar period, significantly higher than for any other period between WWII and 
today.  Was this due to government intervention?  No – it was due to a massive influx of 
previously-unavailable heavy bulk product (oil) into the U.K. economy, most of which 
was carried by the “best” freight mode available for it:  coastal shipping.  Britain’s 
government nonetheless continued to ignore coastal shipping in the 1980s.  A “great 
debate” began in Parliament in July 1982 shortly after the Falklands War, that “centred 
on the tendency of successive Governments to avoid both specific financial or fiscal 
assistance to the shipping industry and the type of protectionist measures… favoured by 
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many other developed countries.” 70  Yet there was virtually nothing in the debate 
concerning coastal shipping. 71 
The Era of Modal Shift 
Japan’s Era of Stable Growth and the resulting changes in the nation’s economy led 
the government to envision a different role for coastal shipping.  It felt – “hoped” is 
probably a more accurate term – that in the future shipping customers would look to 
coastal shipping to provide more diverse services.  Government forecasts predicted that 
mixed freight would take up growing amounts of coastal shipping’s tonnage capacity.  At 
the same time, the government’s Economic Plan for the second half of the 1970s (Shōwa 
Gojūnen-dai Zenki Keizai Keikaku), along with its Third Nationwide Comprehensive 
Development Plan (Dai san-ji Zenkoku Sōgō Kaihatsu Keikaku), reflected a society-wide 
reassessment of priorities.  Strains created by the High-Rate Growth Period had become 
clearly evident, including environmental pollution, delays in the development of social 
infrastructure, a rise in traffic accidents, overcrowding of land, and progressive 
population flight from rural to urban areas.  According to the new priorities, transport in 
the future was to take into consideration protection of the environment, energy efficiency, 
as well as the efficient usage of labor. 72  Coastal shipping was known to be advantageous 
in all these respects – its emissions of substances harmful to the environment, per-freight-
unit energy usage, and ratio of labor to freight quantities are all much lower than for the 
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other major freight-carrying mode of modern times, road transport. 73  The two trends – 1) 
changing freight mixes and distribution patterns in transport; and 2) demands for more 
environmental accountability – dovetailed into “modal shift (mōdaru shifuto)”, the 
Ministry of Transport (MoT)’s biggest intervention movement for coastal shipping since 
the 1960s. 
Modal shift was actually not a new idea; it just took a long time before the actual 
phrase “modal shift” was used by the Japanese government.  As early as 1964 the MoT’s 
first annual white paper had discussed the transfer of mixed freight from land to sea.  
Back then the urgent issue was to relieve the overloading of freight railways, occurring 
under skyrocketing demand in the high-rate growth period, onto the excess of coaster 
tonnage available.  MoT’s main proposals at the time were a “correction” of rail’s freight 
rates to help coasters compete in mixed-freight carriage, as well as attempts to make 
coastal shipping more competitive in speed with rail (and trucks) through the 
streamlining of freight loading and unloading at special “domestic-trade” facilities in 
ports. 74  MoT proposals from the mid-1970s on were remarkably consistent, continuing 
to focus on these improved port facilities.  Container ships and long-distance ferries were 
also the subject of much discussion, as they appeared to be excellent solutions for 
lowering the time required to move goods from one transport mode to another during 
trips. 75  As we saw above, long-distance ferry services began to multiply quickly after 
their launch in 1968, and in the 1970s and 1980s the ferries took on increasing 
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commercial truck traffic, allowing coastal shipping to partially offset the loss of bulk, 
heavy-industry freight it suffered as Japan’s economy made the transition in the 1970s 
from its High-Growth-Rate Period to the Era of Stable Growth.  While this increase in 
truck travel on ferries is a valid example of modal shift, even with such a boost coastal 
shipping’s domestic freight market share went into steady (though slow) decline in the 
1980s and so the MoT looked for other avenues for realizing modal shift. 
The Plaza Accord of September 1985 prompted the yen to appreciate rapidly, which 
led to a recession.  Recession-fighting measures designed to expand domestic demand 
gave a wake-up call to corporate Japan, who then took the lead in engendering a strong 
economic expansion over the next several years.  This period from 1985 on, known as the 
“Bubble Economy,” saw chaotic speculative demand.  Japanese companies and 
individuals ran around the world acquiring large collections of prime real estate and other 
valuable items.  However, a rise in Japanese interest rates in 1990, along with other 
changes in the country’s financial environment, led to rapid deflation in speculative 
demand, in one stroke destroying the balance between asset supply and demand and 
bursting the bubble. 76  Right before the burst, at the tail end of the bubble economy, the 
Ministry of Transport began to push modal shift under that name.  The MoT had 
estimated a huge shortfall of truck drivers by the year 2000 and saw modal shift as a 
convenient solution for the manpower issue in conjunction with the other goals of the 
movement. 77  Finally in 1990 concrete plans arose for the development of “internal-trade 
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unit-load terminals” (naibō yūnitto rōdo tāminaru) at nine ports around the country. 78  
By the next year ten ports nationwide had these systems installed, 79 the number growing 
to twelve in 1992 along with efforts to improve parking areas and access roads into 
fifteen key ports. 80   
Despite these and other modal-shift efforts, coastal shipping’s freight share continued 
to drop between 1990 and 1995.  The idealization touted by the MoT did not equal the 
reality in the Japanese economy; apparently infrastructure improvements were not the 
only concern hindering the effectiveness of modal shift.  Industry stakeholders such as 
Mōri Chikai, head of coastal-shipping company Kawasaki Kinkai Kisen, and Takamatsu 
Shōsaburō, head of the operations committee of the Japan Long-Distance Ferry 
Association (Nihon Chō-kyori Ferī Kyōkai), complained about the plethora of regulations 
on ocean freight carriage effectively rendering modal shift impossible.  They also 
bemoaned that the Scrap and Build Program was preventing ship owners and operators 
from expanding their operations through larger fleets. 81  Yes – experts from the coastal-
shipping industry actually said that Scrap and Build was BAD for the industry.  Appendix 
A Chart 9 seems to confirm this pessimism by illustrating how the number of standard 
commercial trucks carried on ferries peaked in 1996 and then began to decline. 
Actually, as early as 1992 the MoT had begun looking for ways to reduce regulations 
on coastal shipping in order to allow the industry to respond more rapidly to modal-shift 
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measures.  The MoT’s first idea was to relax the rules of the Scrap and Build Program to 
allow more modal-shift-friendly vessels to be built in less time – container ships, long-
distance ferries, or RORO (roll-on, roll-off) ships. 82  The MoT’s line of thinking in this 
respect reflected a wave of deregulation and privatization that arrived in Japan during the 
Bubble Era, key examples of which were the breakup and privatization of Japan National 
Railways in 1987 and public-private joint funding of the new Kansai International 
Airport opened in 1994. 83  According to this “new wave” thinking the Scrap and Build 
Program was a dinosaur legacy of Japan’s protectionist cartel days.  Between 1995 and 
1998 the government eliminated the Program in the name of “free, competitive 
operations.” 84  However, many previous ship owners were holding on to hikiate ken 
new-ship construction credits, which were rendered essentially worthless by the 
dissolution of the Scrap and Build Program.  In response the government instituted a 
compensation, or “soft-landing,” (sofuto randingu) program called the Coastal Shipping 
Temporary Measures Scheme (Naikō Kaiun Zantei Sochi Jigyō). 85  When a ship owner 
wanted to scrap an old ship, he would receive a payment from the scheme, with the 
option of putting that capital back into a new ship.  Others could also put up the capital 
for a new ship to be built.  To industry observers this was basically Scrap and Build under 
a new name, i.e. a continuation of cartelization.  Not only did the new scheme effectively 
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regulate tonnage supply just as before, but potential new operators were still often shut 
out of the industry because they might be refused approval for new-ship construction 
even if they had sufficient funds available. 86  The MoT’s objective of faster production 
of modal-shift-friendly vessels would certainly not be met through this Temporary 
Measures Scheme.  Apparently the MoT was having trouble changing its ways after 
decades of tight regulatory intervention. 
Britain’s modal-shift history also had early inklings:  a 1966 transport policy white 
paper from the Labour government expressed the “paradox” of the benefits of motor 
vehicles and their “severe discomforts” such as exhaust fumes and environmental effects. 
87  However, Conservatives spent much of the next thirty years in office after that white 
paper was released, carrying on a “romance” with “free-enterprise road hauliers.” 88  
According to a 1989 road-construction white paper authored by Conservatives, the 
answer to road congestion was… more roads.  Modal shift (from road to rail in this 
example) was supposedly not practicable because road and rail served different markets 
and thus one could not “readily be substituted for the other.” 89  To be fair, Labour did not 
seem much more enamored of modal shift.  In one of their transport policy white papers 
back in 1977 they had presented an earlier, somewhat more balanced version of the 
Conservatives’ 1989 argument:  “Little of the traffic at present carried on the roads is 
suitable for transfer to water,” even though coastal shipping could be expected “to 
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continue to carry a substantial traffic in bulk freight.” 90  The same thesis received 
academic support in 1991 when consultants presenting research results at a Department 
of Transport (DoT) seminar estimated that only 3.5% of ‘internal [i.e. domestic British] 
road traffic” had the potential for being converted to water through modal shift. 91  As a 
1993 newspaper editorial stated:  “The shipping industry has come to expect few favours 
from this British government, which seems to be unaware of… its [shipping’s] major 
contribution as an environmentally friendly transporter of vast tonnages of goods.” 92  In 
other words, the British government continued to ignore its own country’s coastal 
shipping industry, although this time in a slightly new light. 
Coastal shipping’s freight share in Britain had declined to 15.8% by 1994.  Around 
1997 – only twenty years later than Japan! – the government finally began to discuss 
modal shift as a way to help with environmental issues seen so often in the news.  As 
with Japan, the British government was no doubt spurred on by the Kyoto Protocol, not 
to mention the inclusion of environmental language in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
attracting the attention of EU member states such as Britain. 93  A year later the Labour 
government issued its first white paper in the postwar era devoted to shipping, and the 
first shipping-focused paper from any government since the 1970 Committee of Inquiry 
into Shipping report. 94  The new Minister of Transport, John Prescott, was a former 
merchant navy sailor and thus appeared to have strong interest in the fate of the shipping 
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industry.  Perhaps the best news coming from the shipping white paper was a promise 
that Freight Facilities Grants (FFGs) would be extended to include coastal shipping.  This 
scheme had been supplying funds to operators who could produce for the government 
concrete modal-shift plans to move road freight traffic onto Britain’s extensive 
waterways.  The scheme had yet to be applied to coastal shipping. 95  By 2001 the 
government carried through with its promise concerning the FFGs. 96 
Meanwhile, coastal shipping’s market share continued to drop, down to 14.3% in 
2000. 97  Many complained that the level of government support for shipping in Britain 
was still not enough.  The opposition Conservative party had “broadly supported the 
[1998 Shipping White] Paper” after its release, but four years later the Earl of Caithness, 
a Conservative Peer, commented that the paper had ““produced little that is new,” 
showing how “blinkered the Government [was] by old-fashioned institutional thinking.”” 
98  A newspaper article from the same year lamented:  “The facts are unmistakable; in 
mainland Europe, as in the UK; the roads are congested, the railways find the 
combination of freight and passengers difficult to timetable, while the seas are empty.” 99  
For this writer the issue was not the availability of coastal service – plenty of operators 
were ready to implement modal shift.  Rather, the difficulty lay in convincing shippers to 
try water instead of sticking with their old habits.  Commercial trucking companies were 
known to cut rates in order to hold on to business.  Despite the fact that coastal shipping 
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had improved technologically over the years, “It [would] be a struggle to wrest back trade 
from the road haulage industry, with the whole national distribution system predicated on 
enormous logistics centres at motorway junctions.” 100  As in Japan, Britian by this time 
had moved to a truck-based distribution model for the economy.  As early as the 1950s 
and ‘60s road transport had been altering the nation’s distribution system, as in the field 
of whitefish delivery, where traditional rail-based distribution to local fishmongers had 
given way to a network of specially-equipped freezer trucks delivering directly to 
supermarkets. 101  To make water transport attractive to shippers, that is, to support 
modal-shifting operators who might lose money at first in order to offer rates competitive 
with road transport, the newspaper article’s author asserted that the government would 
have to intervene with the establishment of a UK “Coastal Shipping Bureau” backed up 
by support from ports and other stakeholders. 102   
The government also appeared somewhat less than sincere in the financial aid it was 
already promising, that is, through the FFG scheme.  Out of £34.3 million of government 
funds allocated for coastal shipping and inland water transport from 2001 on, £19 million 
was still unspent as of mid-2006 because an insufficient number of “viable” modal-shift 
projects had been proposed.  In the whole year of 2006 only one project was funded, and 
no FFG money whatsoever paid out in 2007.  Industry experts claimed that the 
government’s FFG application process was too complex and placed too many restrictions 
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on what schemes would qualify as viable. 103  Others were less kind, calling the FFGs 
“bureaucratic nightmares” for which operators did not even bother applying. 104 
Clearly there was a disconnect between the reality of the domestic transport 
marketplace and the well-meaning ideas of government.  How could government 
involvement actually make a difference in the real, everyday economy if the two were 
incompatible?  In 2004 the government set up a semi-autonomous organization, Sea and 
Water, “to promote the newly fashionable notion of ships as congestion-beaters,” but 
simple economics and infrastructure holes stood in the way.  Ports strove to make 
whatever money they could off of visiting ships through the application of various port 
usage fees, while roads remained free of charge for the use of truck drivers.  Some 
claimed there were plenty of coasters available for service, but that they were not trading 
around Britain (i.e. they were off in short-sea hops to other parts of Europe) because they 
simply could not compete with Britain’s “heavily subsidised roads.” 105  The possibilities 
for “environmentally sound” distribution were diminishing as the network of 115 ports 
around the British coastline shrank, reducing the number of locations reachable by sea.    
Smaller ports were closing, as small-ship owner/operators, the only ones who could 
physically reach them (some of which were actually a bit upstream on waterways away 
from the coastline), were bowing out of the industry because they could not cover their 
costs and still make a profit.  New ships tended to be built to take advantage of 
economies of scale, rendering them too big for all but the largest ports. 106  The resulting 
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process of port consolidation was leading to more and longer overland transit legs – 
usually by truck – between ports and inland locations, substituting for coastal segments 
that were no longer possible. 107   
Apparently, then, British and Japanese government efforts to promote modal shift 
were largely ineffective in their early heydey years of the 1990s.  The coastal-shipping 
industry and its customers decided that modal shift was not worth the cost.  Japan’s 
coastal-shipping association umbrella organization ran modal-shift trials and found the 
results disappointing.  For example, on a maritime test route one leg from 
Tokyo/Yokohama to Ise Bay cost about 10,000 yen (about US $100) more per truck on 
water (ferry) than on road, and water took longer as well. 108  The MoT itself spent years 
researching and pushing into production a new Techno Super Liner (TSL), as a low-
emission high-speed (modal-shift-friendly) solution for coastal shipping. 109  The TSL, to 
be launched around 2002, would have been especially relevant after the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol and the strict CO2 emission guidelines Japan set subsequently for the nation as a 
whole.  However, construction and fuel costs on the TSL turned out to be relatively 
expensive, so the idea never took off to the degree hoped for. 110  
According to some, the coastal shipping industry in Japan has not responded quickly 
enough to overcome the mode’s speed limitations, or to improve either the frequency and 
small-consignment-carrying ability of its routes, or its ability to be part of door-to-door 
service.  Such critics are implying, then, that coastal shipping must adapt itself to play a 
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role in the country’s current (truck-based) distribution system.  However, as compared 
with essentially free roads available to trucks, the infrastructure required for effective 
modal shift to coastal shipping seems expensive and complicated.  The MoT’s vision of 
modal shift requires unit-load systems, based on container or other easy-to-load-and-
unload ships,  integrated into ports with special loading/unloading systems, all of which 
actively use Information Technology. 111  Tonnage supply allowed to the industry is still 
effectively circumscribed – since 1998 by the Temporary Measures Scheme instead of 
Scrap and Build – and manpower shortages have been cropping up since at least 1989, 
when the MoT itself began complaining in its white papers about insufficient manpower 
as a result of Japanese society’s plummeting birth rates, as well as a bad public image of 
the industry’s employment practices. 112   A consultant for Japan Seven Eleven 
complained in 1997 that there were neither enough boats nor enough shipworkers in the 
industry for modal shift to be practicable. 113   
Kawame Toshio, Vice President of the Operations Department of Nippon Tsūun, 
perhaps Japan’s largest shipping operator, was brutally honest when interviewed for an 
October 2002 newspaper article.  Even if the national government and/or the coastal 
industry gave the order [for modal-shift], he said, “what transport mode(s) shippers 
choose to use is left up to market forces.”  In the same article Ōmori Kōichi, head of 
Nippon Tsūun’s Environmental-Measures Office, asserted that “[t]ruck rates [were] just 
too cheap” at the time, and that shipping customers, not to mention the trucking industry, 
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would not necessarily accept attempts to switch their freight onto intermodal routes 
including the ocean. 114  The trucking industry is made up of a plethora of small or “micro” 
operators who, when faced with Japan’s continually-lagging economy, might resort to 
extraordinary measures to attract customers even if such measures are temporarily 
uneconomical for them.  Strong competition amongst truck operators themselves was 
even contributing to “reverse modal-shift.”  Spurred on by the “societal mission” 
represented by the Kyoto Accords of the previous year, and by Japan’s national carbon-
emission goals set in response, 115  the MoT in 1998 set a goal to raise the share of all 
long-distance mixed-freight transport on rail or on the seas – at 40% in 1998 – up to 50% 
by 2010. 116  However, in the two years of 2001 and 2002 the actual share dropped by 3% 
rather than going up. 117    
Then in 2003 Japanese coastal shipping’s domestic freight market share went below 
40% for the first time since (at least) 1950.  It would stay below that threshold until 2010. 
118  During this period, in the midst of continuing recession since the bursting of the 
bubble in the early 1990s and the ongoing shift of distribution to truck-centered just-in-
time delivery networks, Japan’s coastal shipping industry faced yet another issue:  rising 
fuel costs.  A constant decline in freight rates further aggravated the situation facing the 
industry.  Many of the industry’s largest customers, such as petroleum and chemical 
companies, had undergone industry consolidation and operations streamlining in the post-
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bubble era to cut down on costs.  After 1998, when the government eliminated rate 
cooperation in the coastal-shipping industry at the same time as Scrap and Build, these 
large customers suddenly found themselves with the power to coerce small- and medium-
sized coastal-shipping operators, who make up the vast majority of the industry (99.6% 
by some accounts 119), into accepting lower rates. 120  The fact that operators had 
difficulties after the elimination of rate cooperation appears to go against a primary thesis 
of this chapter, namely that coastal shipping’s market share varies more with the state of 
the economy and customer demand than it does in response to government intervention.  
However, an attempted refutation of the thesis of this sort does not account for the fact 
that coastal shipping’s market share declined continuously since its peak in 1973, while 
rate cooperation was still in effect.  Conversely, one could argue that the government’s 
“imposition” of rate cooperation in the 1960s, did less to help the industry, and may even 
have done it some harm, by allowing industry members to become complacent in the face 
of government-controlled constraint of competition and thus leaving them ill-equipped to 
deal with the advent of open-market pricing if  such ever came to pass (which it did in 
1998).  In any case, apparently the industry learned to adapt to laissez-faire competition:  
coastal-shipping-association talks with similar customer-industry associations began to 
bear fruit by 2008, as the two sides came to understandings on “suitable” coastal-shipping 
rates. 121  These were private-industry negotiations, not government-led initiatives.  By 
2010 coastal shipping’s market share was back up in the 40% range, despite a nationwide 
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recession caused by ripple effects from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis ( or “Lehman 
Shock” (riiman shokku) in Japanese).  A survey of the coastal shipping industry, carried 
out between July and September 2012, showed that while major customers continued to 
put pressure on industry owners and operators to accept lower rates, coastal shipping 
market share rose even more, up to 43.4% in 2012. 122  The industry’s actions show that 
in the end market forces and their effects on transport demand have been the most 
important factor in determining the health of coastal shipping in Japan.   
Britain’s government continued to offer its FFGs, while its coastal-shipping market 
share had dropped to 13.5% in 2010.  Japan has been working on similar programs to aid 
operators who come forward with concrete modal-shift plans.  The Japanese government 
has set fiscal 2016 as a target for the cessation of ship-scrapping payments under the 
Temporary Measures Scheme. 123  Since the other half of the scheme, payments made for 
new ship construction, is not scheduled for the same termination date, one can only 
wonder how all the small- to micro-sized coastal shipping firms will be able to replace 
their aging fleets once they can no longer receive capital by turning in the old boats. 124  
This will prove to be an especially vexing problem, as Japanese law essentially forbids 
operators from using ships that have been in service for more than fourteen years. 125  The 
government may very well continue its old habits of intervening in the industry through 
some kind of financing for new ship construction.  Whatever their actions may entail, 
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however, the success or failure of coastal shipping in Japan will continue to be driven 
mostly by transport demand determining the mode’s place in the Japanese economy.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to show that in the post-WWII era, the demand for an 
island nation’s various freight transport modes, and those modes’ resulting success or 
decline, vary in response to changes in the nation’s economy, not in response to actions 
by its government.  While in Japan postwar governments acted to circumscribe the supply 
available in certain transport modes, such as coastal shipping, demand was linked to the 
state of the economy.  In the same time period, British governments ignored coastal 
shipping for the most part, so both supply and demand were determined by market forces, 
themselves reflecting the current state of the economy.  Geography would seem to favor 
the use of coastal shipping in both Britain and Japan; however, shipping customers will 
use the transport mode(s) they desire.  Customers send heavy bulk freight by coastal 
vessels because of the relative price advantage as compared with other transport modes.  
Mixed freight and high-value products, however, have tended to move in an overland 
distribution system based on road transport with trucks, at least in the last few decades.  
Just because British and Japanese governments have desired that transport operators and 
their shipping customers try modal shift for mixed and high-value freight does not mean 
that the operators or customers will necessarily comply.  Likewise, if customers see no 
need to pay more and/or change their current shipping habits, it is unlikely that transport 
operators will induce them to do so.  Operators are businesses needing customers to 
survive, and if their cost structure is not competitive those customers will go elsewhere.  
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Since the dominance of road freight transport appears to be here to stay for the 
foreseeable future, one direction likely to be more effective for initiatives on the part of 
Britain’s and Japan’s governments would be the search for cleaner and more efficient 
motor-vehicle technologies.  A 2009 white paper on “low-carbon transport” revealed a 
British government strategy to “ensure that by 2022, the vehicles on [UK] roads will be 
vastly more energy-efficient,” specifically through efforts towards more efficient internal 
combustion engines and “new ultra-low emission vehicles” that “will be available on the 
mass-market.” 126  In a strong case of déjà vu the paper argued that Heavy Goods 
Vehicles (large freight trucks) and van technology must be improved for lower emissions 
because “68 per cent of all road freight movements… are within the same region and 
have no viable mode shift option.” 127  The Government’s efforts in this direction appear 
to have been sincere:  £400M was allocated “to encourage development and uptake of 
ultra-low carbon vehicles.”  A Technology Strategy Board, allocated £140M of that 
government purse, was engaging strategies for encouraging research into such vehicles, 
and was initiating plans for various government agencies to procure fleets of such 
vehicles for use on the job. 128  A 2013 white paper pledged over £500M more investment 
by 2020 in the same directions. 129 
Japanese efforts in this area have a longer history.  The MoT’s 1997 transport white 
paper discussed stricter laws and regulations aimed at reduction of exhaust gases 
including mono-nitrogen oxides, as well as various environmentally-friendly motor 
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technologies in development – methanol, hybrid, compressed natural gas (CNG), and 
electric. 130  The 2007 white paper showed that between 2000 and 2006 Japan had seen a 
big increase of hybrid cars, from about 50,000 to almost 350,000 units, while during the 
same period CNG vehicles had gone from about 6,000 over 21,000 units.  Unfortunately 
electric and methanol vehicles, never very numerous to begin with, had actually dropped 
in numbers. 131  Let us hope that in this endeavor the two countries’ governments are 
more successful than in the realm of modal shift. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COASTAL PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
Introduction 
Coastal shipping achieved a significant share of domestic freight transport in both 
Britain and Japan in the post-WWII era.  This share was determined by the economic 
advantages the transport mode offered for certain types of cargo, and by shipping 
customers’ choice to send traffic on coastal vessels.  In other words, coastal shipping 
found its place in Britain’s and Japan’s domestic transport sectors through the effects of 
market forces.  Government intervention was not a deciding factor in the fortunes of the 
(nominally) private coastal shipping industry, whether in Britain, where the government 
largely neglected the industry and its operators, or in Japan, where the government 
intervened heavily in the industry’s affairs from early postwar days. 
Here coastal passenger transport is addressed for the same period.  While almost 
negligible in terms of passenger volumes in comparison with rail or road, coastal 
passenger transport would remain important in postwar years because it would assume a 
role perhaps unique to, or at least particularly important for, island nations:  transit to and 
from the myriad offshore islands, or ritō, dotting their coastlines.  Even with the postwar 
spread of affordable air transport, ferry service between each country’s mainland and the 
offshore islands would serve as a lifeline for island residents.  In this transport sector a 
situation would arise that is largely opposite to that of domestic freight examined in 
Chapter III.  Whereas freight goes on coastal vessels because of efficiencies and 
economies of scale not obtainable on land, offshore-island ferry service is a losing 
proposition by all economic measures, and survives or perishes according to the level of 
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direct government assistance.  Throughout most of the postwar period such assistance 
would be forthcoming in both countries, to the point that the ferry operators become 
dependent on it.  Only through constant subsidization and/or actual government 
ownership would the ferry companies be able to continue to operate.  With a few rare 
exceptions, the services have no way of being profitable without third-party financial 
assistance.  The islands simply do not support large enough populations to allow private 
ferry operators to turn a profit based only on ridership revenues. 
Since government intervention in the offshore-island ferry services is heavy in both 
Britain and Japan, this chapter will also provide the opportunity for a comparison 
between the two island nations’ systems of government as they are reflected in the 
governments’ respective approaches to this “socially necessary” 1 transport sector.  The 
comparison will show that in Britain the provision of these services has generated strong 
political and ideological debate.  However, in the end virtually all political parties and 
their representatives have supported government assistance, and even ownership, in the 
sector.  Japan’s case will also show strong continuing support for the ferry services; 
unlike in Britain, however, government documents and even newspaper coverage in 
Japan will show a virtually complete lack of political discussion or debate on the issue, 
even after the concepts of deregulation and privatization became fashionable in the 
Japanese economy during the Bubble Era of the 1980s. 2  This lack of discussion will be 
explained as the product of a country where the same political party has ruled almost 
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continuously from 1955 to the present, and where government policy is mostly the 
domain of career civil servants who are neither elected by the Japanese populace nor 
appointed by those who are elected and who thus operate largely independent of Japan’s 
political arena. 
Coastal Passenger Transport Fades Away   
As shown in Chapter II passenger traffic on water declined rapidly in both Britain and 
Japan after railways appeared in the nineteenth century.  Like freight transport, 
transporting people over water was easier, more convenient, and had superior carrying 
capacity in comparison with primitive overland methods.  Once a quick, large-capacity 
overland transport mode such as the railway was available, the advantages of traveling on 
water faded away for passengers.  Railways, moreover, had a sizeable speed advantage 
over sailcraft and were less vulnerable to bad weather.  Sailboats were at the mercy of the 
winds and could be stuck in port indefinitely when big storms reared their ugly heads.  
Steamboats, with their increased speed and independence from wind power, gave coastal 
passenger transport a second lease on life, but the relentless spread of railways eventually 
relegated even coastal steamships to a “pleasure cruise” niche frequented by those more 
interested in the journey over the seas than in reaching the destination in a timely manner. 
Coastal liners 3 provided the last coastal passenger traffic in prewar Britain.  After the 
large-scale destruction of coastal liners in WWII, most owners gave up on resuming 
service after the war, resulting in the near demise of coastal passenger transport 4 except 
                                                
3 In shipping terminology a “liner” is a vessel that keeps a regularly-scheduled route similar to public 
transport modes with timetables.  This is in contrast to a coastal “tramp,” which is hired out on demand 
and its schedule and route decided by the customer(s). 
 
4  Robins, Coastal Passenger Liners, 119. 
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for a handful of companies which eked out “mini-cruises” targeted largely at the vacation 
market up until the early 1970s. 5  By 1950 coastal passenger transport in Japan had 
fallen to only 2.2% of all domestic passenger transport, and this share would drop below 
1% for most of the postwar period. 6  Other than ritō ferries this low level of traffic was 
found mostly on pleasure boats or, from 1968 on, long-distance ferries. 7  Passengers of 
both countries had a huge range of transport choices in the postwar period – railways, 
road transport in the form of either public or private buses or private automobiles, as well 
as airlines for longer distances.  The number of buses in Britain, at 50,000 before WWII, 
jumped to almost 63,000 already by 1948. 8  In Japan motor vehicle ridership quadrupled 
in passenger-km, from 610 million in 1949 to 2.41 billion in 1954. 9  The number of 
passengers carried by British airlines grew from 217,000 in 1938 to an incredible 6.9 
million by 1961. 10  Between 1955 and 1965 Japanese domestic air travel grew from 
360,000 to 5.2 million passengers, a more than fourteen-fold increase. 11 
The Exception:  Offshore-Island Ferry Services 
The large range of choice of speedy, go-anywhere transportation options available to 
postwar Britons and Japanese relegated water transport primarily to the aforementioned 
“pleasure cruise” niche role except, of course, in the case of offshore-island residents.  
                                                
5  Ibid., 125-27. 
 
6  Appendix A Chart 10. 
 
7 Un’yushō, Un’yu hakusho, 1976 Kakuron II (I) Dai 2-shō Dai 2-setsu no 3. 
 
8  Temple, “A difficult and peculiar section,” 217. 
 
9  Yamamoto, Transportation in Japan, 208-09. 
 
10  Dyos and Aldcroft, British Transport, 399. 
 
11   Kokudō Kōtsū-shō, Kōtsū kanren tōkei, I.I-1, spreadsheet 23000000x011.xls. 
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For them ferries have been a lifeline, the only means of contact between their homes and 
the outside world for islands without air service or road connection by bridge.  Yet by the 
postwar era offshore-island populations dwindled to such a point that private operators 
could no longer run the ferry routes without government subsidy.  As of 1965 there were 
461 populated ritō in Japan whose residents, all totaled, represented only 2% of the 
nation’s population. 12  In 1967 companies running ferries to these islands had an average 
income as percent of expenditures of 76%, dropping to 67% the next year. 13  Service 
declined, boats aged, and some of the routes were covered as infrequently as twice a 
month. 14  By 1952 the government was already subsidizing 26.5% of operator losses, 
and by 1970 that number had jumped to 75.5%. 15  In Britain the vast majority of the 
offshore islands lie off the west and north coasts of Scotland.  As of 2004 a total of 96 
inhabited Scottish islands had an average population density of about 0.08 people per 
hectare, as compared with 33 people per hectare in Glasgow. 16  In stark contrast with 
British Government’s overall neglect of coastal shipping (especially for freight) virtually 
all of Scotland’s ferry services in the postwar period came to be operated by government-
owned companies or via heavy public subsidies to private firms.  When the Labour 
government nationalized all public transport in 1947, it inherited several shipping 
concerns owned by railways that had been formerly in private hands.  Two of these 
operating between Scotland’s West coast and offshore islands – 1) the Caledonian Steam 
                                                
12  Un’yushō, Un’yu hakusho, 1965 Kakuron II (I) Dai 2-shō Dai 2-setsu no 5.  
 
13  Ibid., 1969 Kakuron II (I) Dai 2-shō Dai 2-setsu no 4.  
 
14  Ibid., 1965 Kakuron II (I) Dai 2-shō Dai 2-setsu no 5.  
 
15  Ibid., 1970 Kakuron II (I) Dai 3-shō Dai 2-setsu no 3.  
 
16  Scottish Executive, Scotland’s Transport Future, 10. 
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Packet Company and 2) David MacBrayne Limited (50% stake owned by the 
government) – were handed down through various incarnations of Britain’s nationalized 
transport body until 1969.  In that year the government purchased the remaining 50% of 
David MacBrayne Limited and merged it with Caledonian Steam Packet Company to 
form Caledonian MacBrayne Limited (usually “CalMac” for short) as of 1 January 1973. 
17  The government at first tried to draw a line between money-making and money-losing 
routes by leaving eight ships with a separate unit under the name of David MacBrayne 
Limited, but by 1980 it recognized that none of the routes could run without subsidy and 
thus David MacBrayne’s assets were brought completely into the CalMac fold. 18  By 
1980, therefore, a fully-government-owned company had a virtual monopoly over 
Scotland’s West Isles ferry routes.  At the same time North Sea islands off Scotland’s 
north shore were being served by the private company P&O Scottish Ferries under a 
contract rich in government subsidies. 19 
Government and Politics Reflected in Offshore-Island Ferry Services 
Japan 
Despite heavy government assistance, offshore-island ferry services in Japan are 
largely free from the effects, or even the attention, of Japanese politics. In reading 
through the Ministry of Transport’s (MoT) annual White Papers (un’yu hakusho) from 
1964 to the present, one hardly sees any language critical of politicians, much less 
indicative of debate between parties.  In terms of policy directed at offshore-island 
                                                
17  Robins and Meek, The Kingdom of MacBrayne, 189. 
 
18  Ibid., 200. 
 
19  Ross and Simpson, “P&O loses ferry service;” Lloyd’s List International, “Gourock/Dunoon ferry 
service;” Howarth and Howarth, The Story of P&O, 193-94. 
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transportation, the MoT white papers reflect a principle of long-term, sustained support 
for ferry routes not able to stay profitable through fare income alone.  Specific 
government support programs come and go under various names, but the main purpose 
behind all of them is to fund the ferry operators, the construction and maintenance of 
ships, and associated infrastructure such as island ports.  Likewise, support of offshore-
island airports and money-losing air routes is also provided as needed. 
This lack of political debate is understandable, given Japan’s virtually unbroken 
record of one-party politics since 1955 under the LDP.  Similarly, the continuity of policy 
is also understandable, given that it emanates mostly from the unelected, career civil 
servants of the state bureaucracy. 20   
Britain 
As noted above it was originally Labour’s 1947 nationalization of British transport 
that brought some offshore-island ferry services under government control.  As socialists, 
members of the Labour Party saw “[p]ublic ownership… as a means towards achieving 
the ultimate ideals of socialism.” 21  Conservatives, however, grounded their philosophy 
in tenets such as respect for tradition, preference for limited government, and defense of 
property rights, 22 a surefire recipe for opposing nationalization and centralization of 
transport institutions.  Back in power in 1951, Conservatives set about decentralizing the 
national transport apparatus, eventually in 1960 breaking up Labour’s monolithic British 
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Transport Commission formed in 1947. 23   Conservatives then acted on the 
recommendations of the Beeching Report they commissioned in 1963 by closing large 
numbers of “redundant” rail routes and stations to stem the huge financial losses of 
British Rail, which was succumbing to the transport battle with motor vehicles. 24  Labour 
fought back in 1968 through a Transport Act that largely regrouped government rail and 
road freight holdings as well as national bus and offshore-ferry services. 25  However, 
starting in 1979 Conservatives had an eighteen-year stretch in power, their longest run in 
postwar history.  A 1980s wave of liberalization arriving from the U.S. pushed 
deregulation in many areas of British industry.  This wave dovetailed with Conservative 
efforts to stem inflation through reductions in government spending, leading to a long 
string of privatization of government industries including those in the transport sector:  
the British Transport Docks Board in 1981, the NFC in 1982, the NBC and the British 
Airports Authority in 1986, British Airways in 1987, and finally British Rail in 1996. 26  
When Labour regained power in 1997 the fight had gone out of them and they made no 
effort to undo the Conservatives’ work.  In fact, they “abided by the previous 
government’s public expenditure targets while continuing the privatization and 
deregulation process.” 27 
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Yet amidst all this frenzied privatization Conservatives appeared to maintain a soft 
spot for socially-necessary transport services.  The 1960 Highlands and Islands Shipping 
Act, which allowed a more active public role in maritime transport in those regions of 
Scotland and which culminated in the formation of CalMac, was passed under 
Conservative watch.  The Beeching Report of 1963 attempted to limit cuts off rail lines 
considered socially necessary, to those which already had redundant bus services. 28  
Conservatives did make a few attempts towards privatization of CalMac, but reversed 
their decisions based on feedback from ferry customers and other stakeholders.  First in 
1981 the government planned to withdraw CalMac funding for one popular ferry route 
and apply the funds instead towards a privately-owned company.  However a year later, 
under pressure from Conservative party colleagues, the Scottish Secretary George 
Younger withdrew the plan. 29  Then in the late 1980s Conservatives broke up and 
privatized the state-owned Scottish Transport Group, which subsumed CalMac.  This 
action was met by a groundswell of protest from island residents and local authorities, 
joined by calls from Labour and Liberal Democrats stressing the greater importance of an 
integrated ferry network over Conservative ideology.  The Conservative government had 
no choice but to maintain CalMac as a public company with its ferry route monopoly.  
Although CalMac’s need for subsidies dropped as ridership increased over the next few 
years, in 1993 the Treasury began to pressure Scottish local government to again look at 
privatization of the CalMac network. 30  The Scottish authorities hired a consulting firm 
                                                
28  British Railways Board, Reshaping of British Railways, 19-20. 
 
29 Lloyd’s List International (LLI), “…Government's intention to de-nationalise…;” LLI, “House of 
Commons…;” Guardian, “Secretary of State…;” LLI, “Gourock/Dunoon ferry...” 
 
30  Guardian, “Revived Ferry Sale Fears…” 
 
 89 
to look into the matter, which announced a year later that government would find little, if 
any, savings by privatizing CalMac.  Thus Conservatives again conceded to majority 
opinion by leaving CalMac public. 31 
The return of Labour around the mid-1990s would mean the end of Conservative 
privatization attempts of CalMac and its network.  Scotland’s new Secretary of State as 
of 1995 was a Labour Party member.  In 1997 the Labour Party took power again in the 
national UK government.  And in 1999, through a devolution process approved at the 
national level, Scotland took a big step toward autonomy when its Parliament resumed 
operations for the first time since 1707.  Suddenly in Scotland, the UK two-party debate 
was overshadowed by Scotland’s own internal politics (at least in local newspapers). 
Conservative MSPs (Members of Scottish Parliament) have always held a minority of 
seats behind Labour and the Scottish National Party (SNP) since the Parliament’s revival 
in 1999 up to the present, and these Conservative, at least in public, have virtually always 
joined the majority in support of the state-owned CalMac network (as have the Liberal 
Democrats, the fourth major Scottish party often heard in the news).  Thus after 1999 it 
would take a very different “villain” to threaten the hegemony of the West Scotland ferry 
network.  What became this villain was the European Commission (EC).  Starting in 
early 2000 the EC began asking the Scottish government for detailed information 
regarding CalMac and the roughly £15 million subsidy it received from the government 
each year towards operating expenses.  The EC was concerned that this arrangement was 
violating European law, which required any state-subsidized ferry route to be put up for 
bid every five years as a way of ensuring that private operators had a fair chance to 
compete for the route.  A long, drawn-out process ensued whereby the Scottish 
                                                
31  Independent, “Ferries Set to Escape Privatisation.” 
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government first objected to the bidding process, then tried to delay it as long as possible 
while asking the EC to allow the whole CalMac network to be put up for bid as one piece.  
The fear was that if the network were broken up private operators would “cherry-pick” 
the profitable routes and leave the state with the tab for the money-losing routes. 32  At 
least with the network in one piece an operator could “cross-subsidize” money-losing 
routes using revenue from the profitable ones.  
In November of 2011 the EC ruled that the route network could be put up for bid as 
one piece.  An article in the Aberdeen Press & Journal dated November 15th is typical of 
the new “Scot first, politician second” attitude:  the Labour transport minister and 
representatives of the other three big parties all praised the decision, one even mentioning 
how “MEPs [Minister of European Parliament] and MSPs of all parties worked together 
to secure this decision…” 33  Yet labor unions and politicians continued to fight against 
the bidding process, claiming that EC ministers would eventually allow CalMac to be an 
exception to the EC bidding law once the ministers understood the importance of the 
lifeline services to West Isles residents.  In 2004 the Scottish Parliament voted to reject 
the bidding process. 34  Another Parliament vote the next year allowed bidding to go 
forward. 35  In the end CalMac was left as the only bidder after all other candidates 
dropped out.  Politicians all pointed fingers at each other and the EC, and called the 
whole affair a colossal waste of time and money.  Yet no one was (publicly) unhappy that 
the routes would remain as one network under CalMac control. 
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Meanwhile, the same bidding process was being applied to ferry routes serving 
Scotland’s North Isles (Orkney and Shetland), which had been run by private P&O 
Scottish Ferries since the early 1970s under a government contract rich in subsidies.  
Amazingly enough, while still the subject of possible break-up itself, CalMac joined up 
with the Royal Bank of Scotland as one of the bidders for the North Isles routes 36 and 
won, taking over the routes and the attached £11 million-plus annual subsidy from P&O 
in 2002. 37  Thus from 2002 virtually all Scotland ferry routes were state-owned, funded 
and operated until 2012, when CalMac lost its third North Sea bidding war to a private 
service company.  Not surprisingly, the “private” successor continued the routes under 
heavy government subsidies. 38 
Conclusion 
Postwar Japan’s true transport policy makers are largely non-elected career 
bureaucrats, who are able to ignore political infighting and exigencies in order to focus 
on long-term policy goals benefitting Japanese society as a whole.  In terms of the coastal 
shipping industry that policy has entailed financial support and strategic “advice” given 
to companies which are nominally under private ownership and operation.  Year after 
year in its White Papers the MoT has restated that offshore-island ferry routes were 
required for the islands’ residents, and thus economically-unviable routes were to be 
subsidized.  In postwar Britain, the frequent flip-flop between Labour and Conservative 
politics is usually a mitigating factor in the development of government transport policy 
and decisions.  Yet both friends (Labour) and foes (Conservatives) of nationalized 
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industry in Britain have shown support for public funding of socially-necessary transport 
services such as the CalMac ferry network.  In both Japan and Britain the mantra of 
“social necessity” appears sacred. 
To understand why government involvement in transport is not simply a given in both 
countries, one must understand the basis of the debate over public versus private transport.  
Supporters of the latter argue that only privately-funded operators and owners can be 
truly motivated to improve services and lower costs.  After all, if they do not do so they 
will lose business to others.  Even in the case of a private operator who has no direct 
competition, the operator will not be able to stay in business unless it at least breaks even 
financially, and will not bother to continue in business unless it turns a profit.  
Additionally, proponents of private transport argue that it is unfair for individual 
taxpayers to fund transport they may never use for the benefit of other members of 
society.  Private operation and finance mean that only actual users, and not all of society, 
pay for services rendered.  Proponents of public transportation, on the other hand, believe 
in the virtue of an integrated transport system, where all transport modes work in 
coordination to provide the greatest benefit to society as a whole.  They argue that only 
the state is big enough and rich enough to fund and operate such an integrated system, 
whereas private concerns will choose to, or be forced to, cherry-pick profitable parts of 
the transport network to the detriment of unprofitable socially-necessary parts.  Only the 
state has the wherewithal to fund socially-necessary money-losing transport services 
indefinitely. 
If one applies the positions – support for private versus public transport – to the 
example of offshore ferry services, the majority opinion of Scotland vis-à-vis CalMac 
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becomes more understandable.  Throughout the bidding processes, newspapers frequently 
documented the fears of stakeholders – island residents, businesspeople, and politicians 
alike – that private operators would prioritize profitable routes and let the others fade into 
oblivion.  However, a standard government counterargument was that any private 
operator who won a bidding contract would be subject to the same standards of service 
(and safety) that had applied to the CalMac monopoly. 39  Something else must have been 
worrying the opponents of a CalMac breakup.  We can find the answer by again looking 
at local newspapers.  They were concerned about continued integration of services on the 
ferry network.  CalMac was one of many voices claiming the necessity for a single 
operator running the whole network.  Only a single operator controlling the whole 
network, the voices claimed, could optimize efficiency and service, including integration 
of route schedules, marketing of the whole network as one to maximize tourist draw, 
retasking  vessels in the case of breakdowns or emergencies, and even cross-subsidizing 
money-losing routes with profitable ones. 40  Hence the desire of most stakeholders to 
keep the whole CalMac network together even if a private operator were to take over, 
becomes understandable. 
Dissenting opinions have not appeared amongst politicians since George Younger’s 
term as Scottish Secretary, but one finds such opinions in the general public, both in 
editorials and letters to local papers, as well as in those same papers’ interviews of 
academic experts on Scottish shipping.  These voices complain that monopoly has led 
CalMac to become complacent, to let the quality of service slip while costs and fares rise. 
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41  Is there a way to combine the best features of both public and private transport, while 
leaving out the disadvantages?  Perhaps not completely, but a promising alternative has 
appeared recently in the offshore-ferry networks of both Britain and Japan.  This is the 
phenomenon of “Public ownership, Private operation” (kōsetsu min’ei-ka) which entails 
institutional separation of transport operations from the infrastructure (ports, wharves, 
vessels).  Operators are then free to focus on operations.  While private operators still run 
their businesses with a profit motive, the lack of high fixed costs associated with 
maintenance and improvement of the infrastructure would allow them more easily to 
make a profit even if their network includes some socially-necessary unprofitable routes 
(where cross-subsidization can help).  In the “Public Ownership, Private operation” 
system infrastructure costs are funded by the “deepest pockets,” i.e. the state.  Some 
taxpayers may never benefit from the infrastructure, but such a compromise is much 
easier to defend than complete public funding of the entire network structure including 
operations.  Such a defense may involve an argument of the following type:  public 
funding covers road development, so it should also cover infrastructure costs for other 
transport modes.  In the case of ferry routes there is no “highway” to pay for, so the funds 
would default to whatever maritime infrastructure exists, namely ports, wharves, and the 
vessels.  If taxpayers still insist on paying only for what they actually use and thus object 
to government funding of the ferry routes, the government could then insist that the 
objectors pay a share of road infrastructure costs, as more than likely they drive their own 
                                                
41 See, for example:  King, “Economist backs ferries tender,” Scotsman, “CalMac monopoly must go,” 
and Dalton, “Lifeline…or millstone for taxpayer.” 
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motor vehicles. 42  But few objectors would consent to this, especially commercial motor 
vehicle operators who are currently able to keep operational costs low by riding the 
infrastructure for free. 43 
The remaining component to tackle is the concept of an integrated network.  But what 
constitutes an “integrated network”?  In the case of passenger transit it equates to the 
ability for passengers to move quickly and easily between transport modes or between 
lines of the same mode.  For example, having bus stops right along the outer perimeter of 
a train station greatly simplifies intermodal connections in one facility, where passengers 
switching between modes need not walk long distances nor take the risk of crossing busy 
roads or streets.  The case of freight is more complicated because the traditional 
bottleneck in intermodal connections has been the transfer of freight from one vehicle to 
another, often a labor-intensive and time-consuming process that also risks damaging the 
cargo with each transfer.  Intermodal containers are a common solution to this issue, 
helping to save time and safeguard the cargo by obviating the need for the cargo itself to 
be touched, but containers still require appropriate infrastructure for transferral between 
modes.  Another popular solution is motor-vehicle ferries, where again time and money 
are saved because the freight need not be touched and even the transferral of a container 
                                                
42  This, of course, is one of the ideas behind toll roads.  The expressway (kōsoku dōro) network in Japan 
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43  One of the reasons railways have had such trouble competing with road traffic in the postwar era is that 
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is not needed.  The important point is that network integration, whether for passenger or 
freight traffic, is really an infrastructure issue and thus should be practicable in a kōsetsu 
min’ei-ka model.  As concerns the non-infrastructure aspects of an integrated network, 
such as route scheduling, private operators who each run different segments of one 
network may on first glance not appear to have any motivation to coordinate their 
timetables with the rest of a transport network, but doing so actually stands to bring them 
more traffic, and in more regular flows to avoid vehicle overcrowding so the trip is more 
comfortable for passengers as well as allowing operators to save on fuel by running 
smaller-capacity vehicles. 44  Where operator competition exists over a single leg of the 
network, coordination of timetables with other parts of the network is part of providing 
customers with the best possible service in order to win the competition. 
In Japan local public entities have sometimes resorted to purchasing needed ships 
when financially-strapped ferry-route operators were not able to afford them.  These 
ships are then “lent” back to the ferry operators for free.  Both parties benefit – the local 
public entities are able to fulfill their mission of improving the quality of life of residents 
in the region through improved ferry service, and the operators are able to stay financially 
afloat without the worries of heavy ship costs.  In 2009 the Japanese national government 
set up a program specifically for providing funds to local institutions interested in such 
                                                
44 Transport infrastructure is ideally designed to handle peak traffic flows, e.g. a ferry route which has an 
average daily ridership density of ten riders but a peak density of fifty riders during rush hours should 
ideally be designed to handle fifty riders comfortably.  But doing so would mean that for most of the 
day the vehicle is underutilized and “overdesigned” for the task at hand.  Anyone who has ridden a 
crowded commuter train can testify to the fact that either infrastructure designers tend to underestimate 
peak ridership, or that compromises are made vis-à-vis capacity to reduce development costs.  However, 
clearly most infrastructure projects aim for capacity above that required by daily average ridership.  Any 
effort towards spreading out passenger traffic to make daily traffic peaks less intense, e.g. through 
intermodal or interroute timetable coordination to avoid buildup of waiting crowds, can translate to 
infrastructure design savings, a factor which, in my opinion, should be considered as part of any private 
operator’s bid to run transport routes. 
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arrangements.  Funds allocated for the program from the government’s 2009 fiscal-year 
budget were 8.8 billion yen (about US$74 million). 45  In Britain’s case, CalMac was 
actually split into two entities in anticipation of the West Isles route bidding process.  A 
new David MacBrayne Ltd. took over the infrastructure while operations were left in the 
hands of another new entity, CalMac Ferries Ltd. 46  In the future this arrangement would 
allow CalMac Ferries to bid for the routes, and other firms interested in bidding would 
not need worry about the huge task of funding all of the West Isles ferry network 
infrastructure along with operating the routes.  Scotland’s case is not a perfect example of 
the kōsetsu min’ei-ka model, as the Scottish Government subsidizes even private 
operators who run the ferry routes, as illustrated above with P&O and its successors in 
the North Sea market.  However, even in Scotland the separation of infrastructure 
ownership and management should allow ferry operator(s) to improve their fiscal 
discipline and customer service by focusing solely on ferry operations. 
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CHAPTER V 
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WATERWAYS? 
Introduction 
Water transport was the preferred method for moving people and goods for most of 
Britain’s and Japan’s history.  Only in the nineteenth century, with the debut of quick, 
efficient, high-capacity overland transport, did transportation on the water encounter true 
competition.  Railways took much of the passenger traffic away from water in short order.  
For cargo handling coastal shipping remained significant – as it does to the present day – 
because it continued to be cheaper than railroads for moving large quantities of low-value 
bulk materials in island countries, where most inland locations are not far from the ocean.  
Inland water transport, however, did not fare so well.  Its slow speed compounded by the 
complicated lock systems of the canals, as well as its relative susceptibility to adverse 
weather, made inland water transport (IWT) uncompetitive with rail for short distances.  
In Britain long-distance transport had always been the preserve of coastal shipping; IWT 
never developed into a long-distance mode because of the unintegrated, fractured nature 
of both the layout of the waterway network and ownership by a myriad of private 
concerns.  Japan’s artificial waterway networks were always focused on urban areas, 
leaving the interurban distances available to coastal shipping, and then to rail once it 
arrived.  Railway lines could be built almost anywhere, and eventually these usurped the 
lion’s share of IWT’s cargo.  In the twentieth century IWT faced even stronger 
competition from motor vehicles.  Overland transport by rail and road was faster and 
more convenient than IWT for bringing freight to locales along the coasts, and therefore 
more shipping customers and transport operators preferred overland routes.  The 
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government prioritized the upkeep of land-based infrastructure over that of canals and 
rivers.  The condition of these waterways deteriorated as a result, making IWT grow even 
less competitive, the process continuing in a vicious circle.  This decline accelerated in 
the post-WWII era.  The performance and traffic levels of IWT reached their nadir with 
the explosion of expressways in both Japan and Britain starting in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. 
Thus, from early on in the postwar era it would become clear that IWT had a doubtful 
future as a commercial freight mover, leaving the Japanese and British governments with 
two options:  to kill off the canals or to preserve them for another use.  As this chapter 
will argue, governments chose the latter, actually stressing use of waterways for reasons 
other than commercial freight carriage.  Growing grassroots support, starting from the 
very early postwar years, helped save canals and rivers for recreational use in Britain, 
which from the 1960s became the focus of government policy towards the network.  
More recently, since the 1990s modal-shift activities as described in Chapter III, 
promoting the “shift” of transport traffic from inefficient, polluting trucks to rail and 
water modes, have been behind attempts to find new and ingenious ways to use the 
waterways in both Britain and Japan.  The difference is that modal shift in Japan has held 
a lower priority for the government than the restoration of rivers and canals for 
emergency use in times of natural disaster. 
Historical Development of Waterways After World War II 
Britain 
When Britain’s post-war Labour government nationalized most of the nation’s 
transport under a British Transport Commission (BTC) on 1 January 1948, the railways 
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brought under the BTC’s control came not only with some coastal vessels and routes, but 
also a network of some 2000 miles of waterways which eighteen of those railway 
companies had acquired. 1  The BTC now controlled a nationwide intermodal transport 
network, giving it some ability to steer freight traffic to the transport mode(s) of its 
choice.  For coastal shipping this was a negative development; the industry suffered as 
the BTC shifted coal traffic away from coastal liners towards its “darling” railways.  The 
BTC also put coal traffic on its canals, both for domestic use and for shipment from 
inland collieries out to coastal locations for export.  Some of the coal was carried by the 
BTC’s own 800-strong fleet of waterway craft.  This new traffic, along with oil carriage, 
allowed IWT’s share of total domestic freight transport to actually grow in the years 
between 1948 and 1952. 2  But Conservatives, who took power again from 1951 on, were 
less interested in IWT than they were in private enterprise and competition in transport, 
especially on roads.  Over the next decade or so, while IWT freight tonnage dropped 8% 
for all waterways (13% in ton-miles) and 18% for the BTC’s own part of the national 
network in the face of road and rail competition and declines in coal exports, 
Conservatives played with various classification schemes that would divide the canals 
based on their potential uses.  The relatively small part of the network considered to have 
true commercial potential was maintained, while the remainder was either abandoned or 
left to local initiative for private pleasure boating.  This latter activity was spearheaded by 
local authorities in concert with groups of enthusiasts such as the Inland Waterways 
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Association (IWA), formed in 1946 by private initiative.  This latter group had been 
fighting ever since to have the canals protected due to their heritage status. 3 
In 1962, under a Conservative breakup of the BTC, a British Waterways Board 
(BWB) was formed and tasked with figuring out the future of the waterways. 4  But then 
in 1964 there was another changing of the guard, and the new Labour government had a 
similar desire for honest, thorough assessment and resolution of the BWB waterway 
network.  To this end the BWB commissioned a series of reports to assess the true state 
of the network and its future potential.  The reports’ conclusions clearly saw commercial 
freight carriage as secondary.  Primary concern was centered on having the canals in 
sufficiently good condition to support Britons’ recreational uses.  First, the reports 
concluded that little of the waterway network was able to accommodate IWT profitably.  
About four hundred of the two thousand miles controlled by the BWB carried 90% of 
freight traffic.  These consisted of mostly larger rivers near tidal estuaries and sections of 
wider canals that were flat, that is, devoid of locks.  And 90% of that 90% was carried by 
independent private carriers, not by the BWB’s fleet itself.  Between 1954 and 1962 the 
BTC had spent much more in canal upkeep than its earnings through transport operations, 
the deficit expanding from £153,000 in 1954 to £1,068,000 in 1962.  In fact the entirety 
of British waterways, including many large rivers and canals such as the Thames and the 
Manchester Ship Canal not under BWB control, carried much less than 1% of all 
domestic freight ton-miles in 1965.  Next, the commissioned reports concluded that 
another four hundred miles, carrying the majority of the remaining 10% of the BWB 
network’s freight traffic, had “some transport significance, though not a major one” and 
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were not likely to make money from the tolls.  That left twelve hundred miles, called 
“remainder waterways,” for which the BWB had to find a use or relegate to disposal. 5 
The BWB’s actions in response to the reports was clearly weighted in favor of goals 
other than commercial freight carriage on the waterways.  First, the BWB made a 
conscious choice to maintain the remainder waterways in the interests of “amenity” for 
society as a whole.  Instead of imposing an estimated £600,000 annual cost on the 
national government for elimination of the routes or their reduction to minimum water 
flow, the government considered a preferable investment spending about 50% more 
yearly – roughly £900,000 total – to keep the twelve hundred miles in satisfactory 
condition for pleasure boating. 6  This would be made easier by what one of the reports 
termed the BWB’s “already quite extensive” bankside facilities for “cruising.” 7  Next, 
while it was understood that maintenance would continue for the four hundred miles most 
suitable for commercial traffic, the BWB operated only about 10% of the traffic on these 
waterways and began to phase out even this portion at this time. 8  A 1966 Ministry for 
Transport (MfT) White Paper gave Labour’s opinion that IWT’s share of domestic freight 
could “never [again] be significant on a national scale;” the government thus had no need 
to include the transport mode in its national freight plans. 9  Concerning the other four 
hundred miles of waterways, the BWB judged that on an “overcrowded and highly 
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industrialised island” nothing should be discounted if it had some transport potential. 10  
Although the commissioned reports identified these last four hundred miles as having 
“some transport significance,” the reports did not specify the type of transport to which 
this assessment applied.  Given the BWB’s actions for the other sixteen hundred miles, it 
is logical to assume that the BWB uses other than commercial freight transport would be 
given most consideration.     
A 1968 Transport Act inscribed into law the BWB’s decisions, providing government 
subsidies for canal restoration for leisure use and setting aside certain canal routes for 
cruising only to enable enthusiasts to avoid the danger of passing commercial vessels. 11  
The result was a veritable wave of restoration fever emerging from the public.  Local 
groups raised their own funds and volunteer “labor” became more and more available for 
the restoration work. 12  Although the 1968 Transport Act gave the government the power 
to upgrade the status of restored remainder waterways to allow cruising on them, at first 
government funding for the upgrades was not forthcoming.  Private investors were loathe 
to sink significant sums into waterways until upgrades allowed them to be approved for 
transport.  The BWB only sat by and watched them deteriorate.  Finally in 1977 the 
government agreed to extra funding. 13  As of 1990, after eleven years of national 
leadership under Conservatives, there were over one hundred waterway restoration 
projects underway, the BWB working in tandem with local councils and the IWA. 14  
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Commercial IWT freight traffic stayed constant during the Conservative watch, at 2.3-2.5 
billion tonne-km 15 per year.  In other words, Conservatives appear to have carried on the 
non-commercial policy direction of Labour before them, allowing the BWB to continue 
its restoration activities.  However, government financial support under Conservatives 
appears to have had limits – through 1990 restoration projects depended to some degree 
on money “raised through appeal,” and some of the many projects ongoing in 1990 were 
funded, at least in part, through grants from the European Community. 16  
Japan 
The fate of Japan’s waterways has been, if anything, worse than Britain’s.  Boat 
traffic on major canals and rivers was already significantly down before the start of 
WWII, 17 and the widespread destruction of Allied bombing raids only exacerbated the 
situation.  To add insult to injury, the postwar years saw the continuing disappearance of 
riverbanks, a trend which started with the growth of railways in the Meiji era and which 
accelerated with the spread of motorized road transport. 18  Most of the country’s 
artificial waterways were concentrated in cities such as Tokyo (formerly Edo) and Osaka.  
While in interurban areas IWT was being driven to extinction, loading/unloading records 
for Osaka ports show that some of the city’s rivers continued to play a part in freight 
distribution after WWII.  When bridge construction over these rivers began in 1961 as 
part of the construction of an Osaka ring-line railroad, fear that the bridges would have a 
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harmful influence on boat traffic elicited widespread objection.  Bridge designs 
accordingly took ship navigation into account, by means such as the use of spans with no 
support pillars extending down into the river water. 19  However, postwar debris cleanup 
efforts led to yet-unheard-of desperate measures such as the “Unused Waterway 
Reclamation Plan” (Fuyō Kasen Umetate Jigyō Keikaku) of 1947 which, true to its name, 
involved the filling in of the majority of urban canals. 20  In 1950s / 1960s Osaka the 
resulting reclaimed land provided space for local roads and the Hanshin (Osaka – Kobe) 
Expressway. 21   Even major waterways suffered ignominious fates:  many of the 
anchorages and berths of one of Osaka’s major rivers, the Yodo, were filled in between 
1963 and 1968. 22  Tokyo’s Nihonbashi River had a highway built close above it, with 
pillars extending down into the riverbed.  Japan’s High-Growth-Rate Period, between 
1955 and 1975, saw many important water features of Tokyo fade into the background, 
some like the Sumida River were practically demoted to drainage ditches replete with 
foul-smelling water. 23 
The 1990s Renaissance of Inland Water Transport 
By the 1990s very little freight was carried on either country’s internal waterways.  
1996 IWT transport shares for Japan were only about 0.04% of all domestic freight 
tonnage, which was miniscule in comparison with coastal shipping’s 8% share in the 
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same year. 24  Domestic freight transport statistics published by the MoT / MLIT (MLIT 
is the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, a newer version of the 
Department of Transport) give data from 1950 on for road, rail, air, and coastal shipping, 
but nothing for IWT.  Between 1978 and 1986 IWT in Britain maintained a steady 1.3% 
share of domestic freight ton-miles, after which the share began to sink due in large part 
to dropping quantities of oil carried (see Chapter III for a discussion of mid-1980s oil 
transport activities in Britain).  By the year 2000 the freight share in Britain was back 
down to 0.7%.  The Thames, which carried six million tons of freight in 1979, only 
supported half that amount in 1996. 25  Yet both countries were about to see a waterway 
renaissance in the 1990s.  For Britain this would entail a second wave of renewal.  The 
1970s had brought waterway leisure activities to center stage, but this time the big push 
would be for modal shift, propelled by enthusiasm for water transport’s environmental 
friendliness spilling over from coastal shipping into IWT as well.  In Japan, however, the 
main impetus for renewed interest in IWT was the Kansai Earthquake of 1995.  
Government officials looked back at the disaster to learn from it whatever lessons they 
could about emergency preparedness, including the usefulness of waterways as a means 
of transport in times of natural disaster. 26 
Britain 
Labour, back in power in Britain from 1997, immediately began to “encourage 
greater use of inland waterways” and promised to “re-examine the rules of the freight 
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grant regime [FFG] with a view to encouraging more applications for inland waterways 
projects.” 27  This FFG scheme was actually applied first to waterways, and later 
introduced to coastal shipping around 1999.  The government went as far as asserting that 
the waterways could “provide a catalyst for urban and rural regeneration.” 28  True to 
their word, Labour awarded £47 million in FFGs in 1999, for water and rail modal-shift 
schemes.  The BWB was given its own FFG of £53.7 million for waterway restoration.  
Between 1998 and 1999 canal repairs fixed 418 locks and dredged 73 miles of the 
network. 29 
While admitting that most IWT freight carriage took place in the tidal areas of the 
nation’s rivers – out of 49 million tons carried by IWT in 2000 only 3.5 million was on 
canals – the BWB was convinced that certain types of bulk, low-value, non-time-
sensitive cargo such as coal or household trash was “appropriate” for this transport mode. 
30  Clearly the four-mile-an-hour speed limits on canals were too slow to allow them to 
play a part in just-in-time distribution systems, but did trash need to travel quickly to 
dump sites?  Already by the year 2000 “huge amounts” of waste were being carried from 
city centers out to landfill sites. 31  Well-known British organizations began to jump on 
the modal-shift bandwagon.  Also in the same year leading department store Marks and 
Spencer began running tests for sending 40% of its baled cardboard waste to a recycling 
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plant over 150 miles away in Birmingham, using waterways for transport.  Under 
consideration was another scheme whereby 2400 tons of waste a week would move by 
barge, saving 45,000 truck trips per year. 32  Sainsbury, a major British supermarket chain, 
began a study in 2006 comparing freight movements in IWT and trucks; surprisingly the 
results showed that in almost every test run goods arrived faster by IWT than on 
congested roads. 33  Perhaps the highest-profile initiative was British Waterways’ £15 
million project to build a new lock on the Prescott Channel, designed to open the way for 
350-ton barges from the Thames up the Lea River to bring freight into, and rubbish out of, 
the new Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park being constructed for the 2012 games. 34  This 
was part of the drive of then London Mayor Ken Livingstone and the Olympic Delivery 
Authority (ODA) to make the 2012 Olympics the “greenest games in modern times.” 35 
Britain made efforts to bring back waterway transport for passengers as well.  A 1997 
transport White Paper announced a “Thames 2000” initiative to “establish new passenger 
services on the River Thames” in line with the yearlong 2000 Millennium Exhibition 
celebrating the arrival of the third millennium CE, as well as to “leave a lasting legacy of 
improved infrastructure and services.” 36  In terms of the latter, Transport for London, the 
local government body whose purpose is to “implement the [London] Mayor’s Transport 
Strategy,” 37 established a River Services branch in 1999.  The “lasting legacy of 
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improved infrastructure” stands currently at about a dozen river piers between which 
various private operators run river tours and a River Bus service. 38  All totaled, traffic for 
River Services, combined with charter boat services and a Woolwich Ferry about ten 
miles downstream from central London, equaled about 6.5 million passenger journeys in 
the 2011/12 fiscal year.  According to his 2013 River Action Plan, London mayor Boris 
Johnson hoped to almost double that number, to 12 million, by 2020. 39 
Despite all these modal shift endeavors, IWT’s share of domestic freight carriage in 
Britain has remained relatively constant, even declining a bit, since 2000. 40  In 2006 
British Waterways shut down the remainder of its own IWT freight operations. 41  At the 
same time the recreational aspects of the network have ballooned:  the number of 
pleasure boats rose above 20,000 for the first time in the 1980s, and to over 35,000 in the 
first decade of the 21st century. 42  Also in the 2000s came the addition of two hundred 
miles of new and restored waterways, marking the first growth of the national waterway 
network since the mid-19th century.  Today close to 3.3 million people visit the 
waterways each fortnight. 43  As of 2 July 2012 the BWB was dissolved and all of its 
waterway network and properties in England and Wales were transferred to a new charity, 
the Canal and River Trust (C&RT).  BWB operations in Scotland have remained under 
public ownership under the name Scottish Canals, but a visit to their Web site leaves no 
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doubt that they, like the C&RT, are devoted to recreational uses of waterways over 
commercial freight carriage. 44    
Any lingering doubts as to the BWB’s primary plans for the 2000-mile waterway 
network can be put to rest by noting a final, interesting point.  Along with the waterways 
the BTC, then BWB, inherited a sizeable portfolio of property related to the waterway 
network, consisting of canalside lots and buildings and locks.  So large was the portfolio 
that by the 2000s the BWB had become the largest owner of listed buildings in Britain 
after the National Trust and the Church of England, with assets worth about £400 million. 
45   The BWB used income from these properties to fund some of the waterway 
maintenance costs, and also to cross-subsidize losses in its freight operations. 46  To 
maximize the revenue from these properties, the BWB actually administered its network 
to the possible detriment of freight carriage.  Choice waterfront properties were sold or 
leased for new housing developments, leaving less room for commercial freight facilities.  
Sea and Water, an autonomous organization formed and funded by the national 
government in the 1990s with the express purpose of promoting modal shift to water 
transport, claimed in 2007 that the BWB had admitted it was not the right organization to 
champion freight carriage on the waterways but was rather a “leisure organisation.”  Sea 
and Water also asserted that the BWB’s property management  activities were working at 
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cross-purposes to the Department for Transport and its FFGs. 47   A London-area 
waterway interest group even surmised that the real intent behind the Prescott Channel 
project for the Olympic Park was to turn the waterways in the area into a large body of 
stagnant water like a big pond which would form a peaceful backdrop for housing 
projects planned for the Olympic site after the games ended. 48 
Japan 
By 1996 Japanese government officials started to look back at the aftermath of the 
previous year’s Kansai Earthquake, and saw a stark lesson staring them in the face:  water 
transport (both IWT and coastal shipping) had played a critical part in rescue, cleanup, 
and support efforts.  Much of the transport of rescue workers, relief goods, and 
emergency patients had been on water, as the earthquake had damaged or destroyed many 
roads and railway lines.  Trains between Kobe and Osaka were not running again until a 
month after the fateful day, and even three months after the seismic horror, many roads 
still lay closed while commuters continued to invest twice as much time as before 
shuttling between Kobe and Osaka.  In the next few years there began a push in 
government circles for a revitalization of IWT.  River berths were to be restored for use 
in times of natural disasters, and for enabling regular maintenance of the rivers 
(especially their riverbanks). 49  Yet the same government circles soon came to see the 
possibilities of IWT in terms of modal shift and other advantages previously attributed to 
coastal shipping.  While NPOs had been working since the 1980s to take advantage of an 
amended River Law giving local residents more say on waterway usage, a new wave of 
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research in the second half of the 1990s sought answers to a host of questions that came 
up in official discussions.  For instance, how could IWT be used to help reduce stress on 
the environment, to improve energy efficiency, to reduce traffic congestion, or even to 
aid in the development of local regions? 50  MLIT formed a committee in 1997 devoted to 
exploring the promotion of IWT.  In the next year MLIT communicated to river 
maintenance organizations nationwide that they had decided on a new policy of 
promoting use of the river berths in “normal times” as well.  Progress was very slow, 
however; ten years later it was clear that the berths were still little used.  Berths on the 
Yodo River were being utilized for tourist boating, but those on Tokyo’s rivers were 
normally locked, so potential pleasure boaters could not gain access to the water.  They 
could not even gain familiarity with the facilities in order to be prepared to use them in 
times of emergency.  MLIT set a goal for 1998 of having measures ready to encourage 
further use, not only for recreational activity but for freight transport as well. 51  In the 
meantime conference groups of riverside municipalities began their own PR activities for 
the promotion of IWT in hopes that it would help revitalize their local communities.  The 
PR activities, funded in part by the national government but with control left in the hands 
of the local associations, included boat tours instructing local residents in the history and 
natural environment of their nearby river(s). 52 
As in Britain, Japan’s waterway renaissance of the 1990s included measures for 
promoting modal shift as well.  Japan’s MLIT completed three IWT test runs on Tokyo’s 
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Arakawa River, moving various kinds of freight – sand and dirt, frozen foods, and 
cement – and gauging costs and CO2 emissions in comparison with road traffic.  All three 
tests showed significant advantages in both areas with the use of IWT. 53  IWT’s freight 
share in 2000 was only 0.2% of all domestic freight traffic in ton-km on water, which in 
turn was 42.1% of total domestic freight traffic for all transport modes combined.  While 
IWT’s share is a very small number, IWT is finding new, original uses in Japan just as in 
Britain:  in 2006 33% of the garbage produced by Tokyo’s 23 wards was carried by boat. 
54  In both countries IWT can hopefully play at least a small role in future modal shift for 
bulk loads which are not time-sensitive.     
Conclusion 
In postwar Britain and Japan both nations’ governments have acknowledged that
IWT’s chances of carrying significant amounts of commercial cargo again one day seem 
slim.  Unlike coastal shipping, the canal network is no longer economically viable as a 
commercial freight transport mode compared with the wide choice of efficient, 
convenient, high-speed overland (and air) modes.  Moreover, given the difficulty 
experienced in both countries with modal shift efforts in the coastal shipping industry – 
as Chapter III has demonstrated – how much commercial activity can realistically be 
expected to “modal-shift” over to IWT? 
Both nations’ governments have instead supported their inland waterway networks 
with primarily non-commercial uses of the waterways in mind.  Britain has had great 
success in establishing its waterways as a national resource for recreational purposes.  
Rivers are also being employed as means for everyday passenger transport, as on the 
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Thames.  Japan’s progress has been much more limited; a regional September 2012 IWT 
symposium offered no evidence of any organized use of Japan’s waterways, commercial 
or otherwise.  Seventeen years after the Kansai Earthquake, the best news the meeting 
could produce was that the berths on Nagoya’s Kiso River were now ready for general 
use and that local companies were hoping to soon start using them for tourism activities 
in line with regional revitalization efforts.  This relative lack of progress in Japan seemed 
not to have taken account of the previous year’s Great East Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake 
and associated tidal wave (known together in Japanese as Higashi Nihon Dai Shinsai), 
perhaps the strongest earthquake in Japan’s recorded history. In the aftermath of that 
event IWT again received attention for its utility during natural disasters. 55 
Of primary importance is the fact that, as this chapter has shown, much of the 
waterway networks of Britain and Japan can only survive with government or other third-
party assistance.  There is no way that the networks can any longer be self-sustaining, 
earning money through tolls to cover maintenance and upkeep costs, as they were before 
the arrival of railways.  For now, both nations’ governments have decided to provide the 
necessary support, envisioning the waterways as an important (non-commercial) resource 
for their countrymen.  Conservatives gave the C&RT a lavish sendoff upon its launch in 
2012:  not only was the BWB property portfolio transferred to the C&RT basically intact, 
but was accompanied by an extra line of government grants to equal up to one billion 
pounds over a period of fifteen years. 56  In one sense the portfolio transfer could be seen 
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as a way of “de-nationalizing” another commercial asset, 57 a typical Conservative move.  
The generous grant funding, however, is reminiscent of Conservatives’ failed attempts to 
privatize the CalMac network in the 1980s and 1990s; 58 perhaps again the party has 
deferred to majority public opinion.  Whatever Conservatives’ true intentions in this most 
recent matter, Britain’s two political parties appear to have been united, if not in intent 
then at least in deed, for much of the post-WWII period with respect to the country’s 
waterways.  Their actions in this respect have reflected overwhelmingly the public good, 
rather than commercial gain.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In the Post-WWII era three major transport modes have vied for commercial freight 
traffic in Britain and Japan:  road, rail, and water.  This thesis has examined the water 
mode as if it were a group of three “sub-modes:”  coastal shipping, offshore-island ferry 
service, and inland water transport (IWT).  The postwar development of each of these 
sub-modes received a whole chapter of historical narrative and analysis.  Two key themes 
which arose in those three chapters were:  1)  the degree of governmental intervention in 
the sub-mode, as compared with private industry’s role; and 2)  the effects on the sub-
mode of stability in government policy and party politics, such as in Japan’s political 
continuity and locus of true legislative activity in the nation’s non-elected, career civil 
service, versus Britain’s flip-flop between Conservative and Labour parties and their 
largely differing visions towards transport policy. 
Chapter III showed that the Japanese government had a strong degree of intervention 
into the coastal shipping industry from the immediate postwar years.  Before the late 
1990s postwar British governments virtually ignored coastal shipping, after which time 
their interest grew but was matched by little action, especially any that served to improve 
the domestic freight market share of the transport mode.  In both countries coastal 
shipping’s “performance,” its traffic levels and success as a private commercial transport 
sector, was determined in large part by the transport needs of industrial development and 
commercial distribution, and more specifically by the private transport service providers 
and customers within those economic sectors.  Japanese government intervention had 
some effect on coastal shipping’s supply of tonnage capacity, as it was intended to, but, 
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as in Britain, in the end the level of demand for the freight transport mode varied in line 
with the strength or weakness of the national economy, rather than as a function of 
government intervention.  In Chapter IV a clearly economically non-viable sub-mode of 
water transport, offshore-island ferry services, would arguably not have survived were it 
not for heavy government support and/or ownership in both countries.  This support, and 
ownership in Britain’s case, was carried out because the transport sub-mode was 
considered “socially necessary.”  In Chapter V another water sub-mode, IWT, was 
acknowledged as economically viable in the postwar era only to a limited degree.  For the 
most part British governments left commercial IWT to fend for itself under private 
operation, instead, like Japan, focusing their own efforts on non-commercial aspects of 
IWT they believed would serve the public good. 
Two general conclusions can be reached in terms of the “government vs. private 
industry” debate for the postwar-era island nations that have been here the subject of 
study.  The first conclusion is that government intervention in commercially-viable 
domestic water transport had limited effect, and met with rather limited success, where it 
was practiced.  In Britain there was no intervention up until the late 1990s, and even after 
that time actual government action was restricted to “arm’s-length” promotion of modal 
shift activities, which were not very successful.  In Japan intervention was heavy 
throughout much of the postwar period.  In 1964 the government began actively 
controlling the aggregate tonnage supply in its nation’s coastal shipping industry.  Yet 
demand for the water transport mode was not a function of government action.  Rather, 
demand remained primarily a function of the transport marketplace itself, namely the 
aspects of customer demand and the service provided in response by private ship owners 
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and operators.  One could even argue that the government, in its efforts to keep tonnage 
capacity within a certain volume range, may have actually hurt the economic 
performance of the industry.  If coastal shipping’s tonnage supply had been free to vary at 
the behest of the industry’s private ship owners and operators, it is possible that the 
industry may have responded even quicker and more effectively to customer demand.  As 
in Britain, Japan’s government then intervened again starting in the late 1990s, in an 
attempt to “sell” modal shift to the nation’s shipping customers.  While the Japanese 
government’s efforts in regard to modal shift were much more active than those of the 
British government, Japanese success rates cannot be said to have been much higher than 
in Britain.  Japan saw significant modal shift with the sharp increase of trucks traveling 
on long-distance ferries, but this effect started in the 1970s, decades before the “height” 
of modal shift that came with the Kyoto Accords in the mid-1990s.  Even this uptick in 
ferry traffic was not enough to keep the overall domestic freight market share of coastal 
shipping from dropping or staying flat during the central years of modal shift activity. 
 When used for commercial purposes water transport will thrive (as coastal shipping 
has done) or wither (like IWT) largely due to its inherent technical and economic 
advantages, or lack thereof, over other transport modes.  Any government intervention 
may even serve to hurt commercial water transport’s performance.  This latter point is 
clearly supported by Japan’s continuance of cartelization beyond 1998 with the 
Temporary Measures Scheme, which, according to shipping operators themselves, 
actually hindered their efforts to expand their operations to respond to variations in 
customer demand. 
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The second conclusion in the government vs. private debate is that water transport has 
many important, or even necessary, non-commercial roles to play in island nations.  If an 
island-nation society chooses to employ water transport in these roles, then the transport 
must be supported by government to some degree, as its costs will outweigh the revenue 
that can be gained from operations alone.  Offshore-island ferry services, and IWT on 
canals for recreational purposes, are two clear examples in support of this conclusion. 
In terms of the second debate, that is, how island-nation water transport was affected 
by the degree of stability in government transport policy and in party politics, there is one 
broad conclusion:  the degree of stability is irrelevant.  Commercially-viable water 
transport works best without any government intervention, regardless of the type of 
policy or politics.  In Britain both Labour and Conservatives were equally “complicit” in 
ignoring coastal shipping for most of the postwar era.  Neither Labour nor Conservatives 
have had much success in recent decades with modal-shift measures in coastal shipping 
or in IWT.  Rule by both parties  saw flat growth in the two water submodes through the 
1970s and from the 1990s on.  Britain’s big “boom” period for coastal shipping came 
from oil in the 1980s, during Conservative rule.  Yet traffic fell off again in the early 
1990s as the oil became less profitable, even though Conservatives were still in power.  
Most recently, absolute traffic quantities have fallen off significantly since 2010 under 
Conservatives – from 30 billion tonne-km in 2010 down to 19.4 billion in 2013. 1  If one 
were to claim that coastal shipping’s boom period were attributable to stability during 
Conservatives’ longest post-war reign, such a claim is contradicted by the very flat 
market-share performance of coastal shipping under the long Labour leadership of 1997-
2010.  In other words, growth or decline in coastal shipping in Britain tracks economic 
                                                
1 Department for Transport, Transport Statistics Great Britain, spreadsheet dwf0101.xls. 
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rises and falls, regardless of how many times political parties came and went.  In Japan 
coastal shipping saw ups and downs in the postwar era, based primarily on economic 
developments rather than government policy or intervention.  Japan’s relative stability in 
government transport policy and in party politics thus cannot be linked with a similar 
long-term stability of performance in the coastal shipping industry. 
As stressed above, government support is necessary for the survival of water transport 
services which are not commercially viable.  All postwar governments in both Britain and 
Japan have been united in support of such services.  Offshore-island ferry transport has 
received a strong continuity of policy in postwar Britain, receiving largely the same 
treatment from both Labour and Conservative governments as they swapped power back 
and forth, so again there is no pattern to be drawn from the level of political stability.  
These services received sustained high support in Japan as well in the postwar era, a 
policy of continued aid similar to that of Britain even though the two countries’ politics 
are so different in their levels of stability and the length of their cycles of change.    
Britain showed much more concern for its canal network in the postwar years than did 
Japan, and the continuity and longevity of that concern belied the frequent shifts in 
Britain’s national leadership.  IWT for recreational purposes received support from both 
Labour and Conservative governments; grassroots support of the waterway network by 
the British public gave both political parties little political choice but to help in those 
efforts.  In Japan IWT was largely invisible until the second half of the 1990s, and not 
because stable government policy, one-party politics, or career bureaucrats wished it to 
be so.  Government was generally uninvolved until after the 1995 Hanshin Earthquake, 
 121  
after which it began to support uses for IWT that, it believed, would be to the public 
benefit. 
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NOTE:  Data is for Great Britain only, i.e. it does not include Northern Ireland Sources: Cox et al., Waterborne Freight in the UK 1983, 1984, 1986   
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Source: Sōmubu Tōkei-kyoku, Dai 12-shō: Un’yu, spreadsheet 12-20-b.xls  
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APPENDIX B 
 
DECODING CITATIONS TO JAPANESE WHITE PAPERS 
 
Post-WWII Japanese white papers, at least those consulted for this thesis, are all 
published online.  As a result they have no page numbers, but rather use a Japanese 
system of hierarchical locators to organize their content, much like the “Section / Article / 
Paragraph” system used in English for laws.  The tables below is designed to be a 
“decoder tool” for the white papers’ locator hierarchy. 
 
 
Hierarchy Level Locator (Romanization) Locator (Japanese) 
1 Sōron / Kakuron    
2 bu # 
3 shō  
4 setsu  
5 (Arabic numeral)  
6 (Arabic numeral in parentheses)  
7 (Japanese Katakana alphabet) 	 	 		 
? Zuhyō (= “Figure” or “Diagram”) /
 
 
In converting all my footnotes that cite white papers into a form legible for those who do 
not read Japanese, I have decided not to translate the locators into English, because any 
such attempt would be arbitrary as far as what English terms I assigned to each Japanese 
locator.  Instead, all I have done is directly Romanize the original Japanese citations.  To 
do this I searched the Chicago Style Manual (CSM) in vain for a comparable example, 
and then developed a system based on the CSM’s rules for English laws and other official 
legal documents:  capitalized but not in italics, e.g. “Section 3 Paragraph 5.”  Putting a 
long set of locators in italics runs the danger of making it look like a Japanese title.  
 
The character Dai  , when used right before a sequence of a numeral and a locator, is 
an ordinal prefix.  For each ordinal group I have capitalized the “Dai” but put the 
romanized locator, which follows the numeral, in lower case with a hyphen between them 
to show they go together.  I have also left numerals in their Arabic form so non-Japanese 
speakers will not have to decode Romanized Japanese numbers as well. 
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Often the word “no”  will be used between the last Japanese (Kanji) numbering level 
and the non-Kanji levels.  For example, “Dai 2 Shō Dai 3 Setsu no 1” would be “Shō 
Number 2 Setsu Number 3 (Subsection) 1.”  The “no” has no particular meaning in this 
context (although “no” is used commonly as a possessive particle).  Rather it is, I believe, 
simply a Japanese numbering convention.  The same convention is used when saying 
aloud Japanese addresses and phone numbers. 
 
For example, a typical white-paper footnote citation would be: 
 
&# & &  &$&%$% 
 
After my Romanization this would be: 
 
Dai 1-bu Dai 1-shō Dai 1-setsu no 1.(1).() 
 
Japanese text normally has no spaces between characters at all in a sentence.  I have 
broken up the example above to show the constituent parts, and also because in the white 
papers each ordinal group in the documents’ numbering systems will be separate anyway. 
 
The white papers vary somewhat in numbering layout depending on the year they were 
produced, but generally they follow the locator hierarchy given above.  The titles Sōron 
and Kakuron are roughly equivalent to “Global Topics” and “Specific Topics,” 
respectively.  In some years the top level or two of locators are dispensed with.  The 
white papers of 1989 – 1996 were not cohesive documents but rather unnumbered lists of 
various topics. 
 
Note that the Kaiji repōto 
 , also published by the same government body 
that has produced the white papers since 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), generally uses the same hierarchy of 
locator numbering.  These papers are like the white papers but only cover maritime 
matters in transport. 
 
Dates for the white papers are written in the Japanese calendar, which is based on 
imperial reigns.  Here is a conversion table for 1964 to the present.  Putting do (  ) on 
the end of the date changes the meaning from “calendar year” to “fiscal year.” 
 
 
Romanization Kanji Gregorian Romanization Kanji Gregorian 
Shōwa 39-nendo  39  1964 Heisei Gan-nendo  1989 
Shōwa 40-nendo  40  1965 Heisei 2-nendo  2  1990 
Shōwa 41-nendo  41  1966 Heisei 3-nendo  3  1991 
Shōwa 42-nendo  42  1967 Heisei 4-nendo  4  1992 
Shōwa 43-nendo  43  1968 Heisei 5-nendo  5  1993 
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Romanization Kanji Gregorian Romanization Kanji Gregorian 
Shōwa 44-nendo  44  1969 Heisei 6-nendo  6  1994 
Shōwa 45-nendo  45  1970 Heisei 7-nendo  7  1995 
Shōwa 46-nendo  46  1971 Heisei 8-nendo  8  1996 
Shōwa 47-nendo  47  1972 Heisei 9-nendo  9  1997 
Shōwa 48-nendo  48  1973 Heisei 10-nendo  10  1998 
Shōwa 49-nendo  49  1974 Heisei 11-nendo  11  1999 
Shōwa 50-nendo  50  1975 Heisei 12-nendo  12  2000 
Shōwa 51-nendo  51  1976 Heisei 13-nendo  13  2001 
Shōwa 52-nendo  52  1977 Heisei 14-nendo  14  2002 
Shōwa 53-nendo  53  1978 Heisei 15-nendo  15  2003 
Shōwa 54-nendo  54  1979 Heisei 16-nendo  16  2004 
Shōwa 55-nendo  55  1980 Heisei 17-nendo  17  2005 
Shōwa 56-nendo  56  1981 Heisei 18-nendo  18  2006 
Shōwa 57-nendo  57  1982 Heisei 19-nendo  19  2007 
Shōwa 58-nendo  58  1983 Heisei 20-nendo  20  2008 
Shōwa 59-nendo  59  1984 Heisei 21-nendo  21  2009 
Shōwa 60-nendo  60  1985 Heisei 22-nendo  22  2010 
Shōwa 61-nendo  61  1986 Heisei 23-nendo  23  2011 
Shōwa 62-nendo  62  1987 Heisei 24-nendo  24  2012 
Shōwa 63-nendo  63  1988 Heisei 25-nendo  25  2013 
 
 
If we repeat the above example, but this time with a date and source title, it would be:  
 
&' "! &# & &  &$&%$% 
 
which my system would translate to: 
 
Un’yu hakusho, 2000 Dai 1-bu Dai 1-shō Dai 1-setsu no 1.(1).( ). 
 
where Un’yu hakusho "! means “Transport White Paper.” 
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